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ABSTRACT

The paradigm shift from static spectrum allocation to a dynamic one has opened many
challenges that need to be addressed for the true vision of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA)
to materialize. This dissertation proposes novel solutions that include: spectrum allocation,
routing, and scheduling in DSA networks. First, we propose an auction-based spectrum
allocation scheme in a multi-channel environment where secondary users (SUs) bid to buy
channels from primary users (PUs) based on the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR).
The channels are allocated such that i) the SUs get their preferred channels, ii) channels are
re-used, and iii) there is no interference. Then, we propose a double auction-based spectrum
allocation technique by considering multiple bids from SUs and heterogeneity of channels.
We use virtual grouping of conflict-free buyers to transform multi-unit bids to single-unit
bids. For routing, we propose a market-based model where the PUs determine the optimal
price based on the demand for bandwidth by the SUs. Routes are determined through
a series of price evaluations between message senders and forwarders. Also, we consider
auction-based routing for two cases where buyers can bid for only one channel or they could
bid for a combination of non-substitutable channels. For a centralized DSA, we propose two
scheduling algorithms– the first one focuses on maximizing the throughput and the second
one focuses on fairness. We extend the scheduling algorithms to multi-channel environment.
Expected throughput for every channel is computed by modelling channel state transitions
iii

using a discrete-time Markov chain. The state transition probabilities are calculated which
occur at the frame/slot boundaries. All proposed algorithms are validated using simulation
experiments with different network settings and their performance are studied.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Radio spectrum is used as an important resource for wireless services (i.e., mobile telecommunication, TV and radio broadcasts, GPS, maritime navigation, tactical communications).
Each service operates on specific portions of the spectrum bands which have been statically
allocated for that purpose. For example, 824-849 MHz, 1.85-1.91 GHz, and 1.930-1.99 GHz
frequency bands are reserved for licensed cellular and PCS services, whereas 902-928 MHz,
2.40-2.50 GHz, and 5.725-5.825 GHz frequency bands are free-for-all unlicensed bands [1]. In
general, radio spectrum allocation and management have traditionally followed a ‘commandand-control’ approach where chunks of spectrum are allocated for specific services under
restrictive licenses. The restrictions specify the technologies to be used and the services to
be provided, thereby constraining the ability to make use of new technologies and the ability
to redistribute the spectrum to higher valued users. In most countries, most of the radio
frequencies have been allocated to specific uses and spectrum appears to be a scarce resource within the current regulatory framework. The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) which is an independent agency of the United States government regulates interstate
communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable services in all states.
There have been experimental studies that found spectrum utilization is typically
time and space dependent and that most parts of radio spectrum are highly underutilized,
1

and there is a great amount of “white space” or unused bands [2, 3]. As a result, it is intuitive
that static spectrum allocation is not the optimal solution toward efficient spectrum access
and utilization.
These limitations along with the dis-proportionate and time-varying demand for spectrum have motivated a paradigm shift from static spectrum allocation towards a notion of
dynamic spectrum management where secondary networks/users (non-license holders) can
‘borrow’ idle spectrum from primary networks/users (license holders), without causing harmful interference to the latter [4, 5]. This concept of dynamic allocation is referred to as the
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) [6, 7]. In DSA, spectrum will be allocated dynamically
depending on need of the service providers which in turn depends on end users’ demands in
a time and space variant manner [8, 9].
A typical DSA network consists of secondary users who coexist with a network of primary users (spectrum owners). A cognitive node consists of a sensor, a radio, a knowledge
database, a learning engine, and a reasoning engine. A cognitive radio is aware of its environment, continuously learns from its surroundings, and adapts its operational parameters. The
cognitive radios continuously monitor the presence of primary users and opportunistically
access the unused or under-utilized licensed bands. The most important regulatory aspect
of these networks is that the secondary nodes must not interfere with primary transmissions.
In other words, when the allocated spectrum to a primary user is not fully used, the primary
user has the option to sell the unused spectrum to secondary users. One of the open questions is how to stimulate the primary users to share their spectrum with secondary users?
2

Therefore economic incentives such as spectrum auctions have been used to motivate the
primary users to sell parts of the spectrum that they do not need.
In most countries, the competitive behavior among service providers for spectrum was
initiated by spectrum auctions held in 2000 and 2001 [10]. Selling spectrum to secondary
users not only adds to the revenue of the primary user, it also increases spectrum utilization.
Obviously, such spectrum trading includes spectrum selling and buying; thus a new economic
model needs to be investigated. In spectrum trading, one of the open questions is how to
determine the price for the spectrum being sold? The primaries need to determine how to
set the price of their residual spectrum? Such optimal sale price evaluation must be done
keeping in mind that i) spectrum is a commodity that cannot be stored for future sale and
ii) there are other competing primaries who are also trying to sell their residual spectrum
to others. Similarly, a secondary user must determine how much to pay to the primaries?
Moreover, after the secondary users buy the spectrum, they must sell the acquired spectrum
to others in the form of services. For example, a secondary user may offer to route packets
on behalf of others for a certain price. Whenever there is an agreement on the price, a sale
is made i.e., bandwidth is sold in the form of a service. In order for a secondary node to do
so, it must first acquire some bandwidth from the primary users. The bandwidth acquired
by the secondary users is then traded amongst each other as packets get forwarded from
one node to another as the packet is routed from the source to the destination. These lead
to a new challenge: how can the source (secondary node) choose the intermediate nodes in
a route such that cost of the forwarding a packet is minimum and the intermediate nodes
3

have sufficient capacity to forward a packet? While the above mentioned question is a
challenge by itself, what makes it even more difficult is the additional constraints posed by
the primary users. Constraints such as the tolerable levels on the signal to interference and
noise ratio (SINR) limit the transmission capabilities of secondary users and thus affects
the routing path. In the recent past, there have been many propositions for auction-based
channel/spectrum allocation; however most of them assume that all channels are identical,
and therefore could be priced uniformly. In reality, channels are heterogeneous in the sense
that they may vary in their characteristics such as SINR or the expected bit-rate between a
transmitter and receiver pair. This would entail that some channels can be considered better
than others and therefore can have varied performance outcomes. As a result, secondary users
are expected to have a preference over the set of available channels. Moreover, secondary
users might want to bid for multiple channels to satisfy their bandwidth requirement.
In the presence of multiple secondary users who try to operate on the same channel(s)
that are not used by the primaries, there has to be some policy for them to access the
channels. Such contention are resolved by the underlying medium access control (MAC)
protocol, wherein the secondary users abide by some transmission policies. MAC protocols
affect many network and radio functions such as channel sensing, resource allocation, and
spectrum sharing [11]. It is worth mentioning that a channel can be used at multiple locations
simultaneously as long as the secondary users using the common channel do not interfere with
each other i.e., they are sufficiently apart. To achieve such simultaneous communications, the
questions that need to be answered are: what is the best representation of the interference
4

constraints and what is the most efficient way to schedule the available channel(s) among
the secondary users?

1.1

Contributions of this Work

This dissertation addresses some of the fundamental challenges that DSA networks face
today. We not only propose novel ways for DSA networks to perform better, we quantify the
expected performance for a given network setting. Mainly, we focus on channel allocation,
spectrum trading, routing, and scheduling in DSA networks.
We propose an auction based spectrum allocation scheme considering the fact that all
channels do not offer the same value to a secondary user. The secondary users realize that
due to the heterogeneity of the channels, the utility they could get in terms of capacity is
different. Hence, we use signal to noise and interference ratio (SINR) as the quality indicator
for a channel. Each secondary user defines his SINR based preference of channels from the
available ones. These channels sorted in a descending order of preference comprise the
preference list. Though these available channels do not interfere with the PUs, there could
be interference if two or more secondary users are allocated the same channel. A secondary
user places multiple bids for the different channels more the preferred ones and less for the
non-preferred ones. The auction is initiated considering the preference list of any secondary
user and if there is no conflict with the most preferred channel, then that channel is allocated
to the secondary user. If there is a conflict, the bids from the conflicting secondary users
5

are compared, and the secondary user with the highest bid is allocated that channel. The
process continues with the second most preferred channel if the secondary user does not get
the most preferred one. If the secondary user gets the most preferred one, the next secondary
user is considered and the same process is repeated. This way, the auction tries to maximize
the allocation of the preferred channels. To measure the fairness of the allocation process,
we compute the achievable bit rate for an allocated channel using Shannon’s theory. In order
to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed auction, we conduct simulation experiments for
different network scenarios and show to what extent channel preferences are met and what
is the corresponding revenue.
Next, we propose PreDA- a Preference based-truthful Double Auction which is a
truthful double auction for DSA networks where the buyers have a preference for the channels
being put up for auction by the primaries. In PreDA, multiple sellers and multiple buyers
participate in the auction that can last for more than one round. A buyer can bid for
multiple bands. Considering the fact that all channels do not offer the same value to a
buyer, the utility they could get in terms of capacity is different. Hence, we use SINR as
the quality indicator for a channel. Each buyer defines his SINR based preferences for the
channels from the available ones. These channels sorted in a descending order of preference
comprise the preference list. The bids are non-increasing as we go down the channels in the
preference list. A bid from a buyer is of the form of a vector that consists of its demand,
preference list, and bid list. We use the interference conflict graph to identify sets of users
who do not interfere with each other, and hence can transmit on the same channel and at
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the same time. Virtual groups are formed with non-conflicting users. Such groups also help
translate the multi-unit bids to an equivalent auction with single-unit bids. To the best of our
knowledge, PreDA is the first truthful multi-unit double auction that guarantees spectrum
reuse by allowing buyers to express their preferences for heterogeneous channels. PreDA
achieves the three significant economic properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, and
ex-post budget balance. We implement three bid-independent grouping algorithms: i) MAXSINR, ii) MAX-Degree which maximizes number of buyer groups, and iii) MIN-Degree which
minimizes number of buyer groups. Simulation results show that PreDA allocates more bands
during the first round, which means most buyers get their most preferred channel. Results
also show spectrum re-usability, profit maximization, and fairness.
We address the problem of routing from an economic perspective in a DSA networks.
We consider that secondary nodes, scattered in a random fashion, acquire spectrum from
the primary users which they then sell to others in the form of services. Thus, the secondary
nodes in this network buy and sell bandwidth in order to forward packets for the purpose of
routing. On behalf of the seller, we determine the price for per unit of bandwidth. To that
end, we propose the selling price as a decreasing log function of the residual bandwidth and
its cost price. We also compute the interference a seller is exposed to. As for the buyer, in
order to achieve a target bit rate, we first back calculate the bandwidth based on the SINR
for each seller. The price per hop is computed based on the bandwidth required and unit
price for that seller. The total cost of a route is the sum of the prices paid at each hop
between the source and the destination. We conduct exhaustive route search techniques and
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show how the route price varies for various routes. The final route path is the route that
has the minimum total cost.
Then we model the selection of the intermediate nodes in a route using a sealed-bid
auction mechanism where the transmitter explores the cost of forwarding a packet by all
potential receivers i.e., the forwarders. Message routes are determined through a series of
auctions between message senders and forwarders. Similarly, a receiver must determine the
optimal bid for it to route packets on behalf of other nodes for a certain price. Whenever
there is an agreement by the transmitter (buyer) and the receiver (seller), a sale is made
i.e., bandwidth is sold in the form of a (forwarding) service. For computing the bids by the
sellers, we find the number of channels a transmitter-receiver pair must use to sustain the
bit rate requirement of a given flow. Of course, the data rate on a channel is dependent
on the SINR the receiver is exposed to on that channel, and is found using Shannon’s law.
Thus, the channels are non-substitutable. As for the buyer, the receiver is chosen such that
i) it is able to sustain the minimum bit rate requirement, and ii) the price to be paid for
the channel(s) is minimum. We consider two cases: i) the seller bids for only one that
satisfies the required bit rate and has the minimum price, ii) the seller bids for multiple
channels. For second case, all combinatorial options are explored. As finding such sets of
channels are NP-hard, we propose a greedy heuristic that finds a reasonable set of channels
in O(nlogn). To validate the proposed routing scheme, we conduct simulation experiments
where we implement route search techniques and show how the route price varies. We also
show how the proposed heuristic performs in comparison to the exhaustive search.
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Most often, multiple secondary users contend to acquire the bands that are available.
Proper scheduling techniques can resolve such contentions. Thus, we propose two slotbased scheduling algorithms. The main goal of the first algorithm is to allocate a channel
to the users such that the overall throughput is maximized. We use the SINR between
a transmitter-receiver pair to compute the expected throughput on the potential channel
which is then used by the scheduler to assign the appropriate channel. Though such SINRbased scheduling schemes maximizes the system throughput, it is unfavorable to users who
experience deteriorated SINR for long periods of time. To overcome this drawback, we
propose the second algorithm– the main goal of which is to maintain some level of fairness.
We use the number of already allocated slots as a (history) index to assign channels. In
order to increase the spectral efficiency, we re-use the channel between the slots and also
between the users in the same slots that do not have any conflict. Such non-conflicting users
are found using the concept of Independent Sets (IS) in the conflict graph. Using simulation
experiments, we show the trade-offs of the two schemes and mention how the two could be
combined to achieve a desired objective.
Then we go a step further, and propose a queue aware frame-by-frame and slot-byslot scheduling algorithms for a multi-channel DSA network. Unlike traditional opportunistic
scheduling algorithms (which try to maximize the instantaneous throughput), we not only
consider the SINR between a transmitter-receiver pair but also consider the number of packets waiting in the queue of the transmitter. That way, we make sure that the secondary
users make use of the channels to the best possible extent. This also avoids allocation to
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non-backlogged users. We calculate the expected throughput for each channel and for each
time slot in a super-frame. We do so by considering the state transitions of the primary
channel occupancy, channel quality, and the queue status. The state transitions are modeled using a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) process. In order to have collision-free
transmissions, we use the interference conflict graph and identify the sets of users who do
not interfere with each other, and hence can transmit on the same channel and at the same
time (slot). Each set of users is assigned one or more channels and one or more time slots
based on which set maximizes the overall system throughput. Through extensive simulation
experiments, we show how the proposed frame-by-frame and slot-by-slot scheduling perform
with respect to many factors.

1.2

Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the related work that are relevant
to this dissertation. Chapter 3 discusses the basics of auction theory, along with single and
double auctions for channel allocation. Economic routing models are presented in chapter
4. In chapter 5, the single channel and multi-channel opportunistic scheduling algorithms
are discussed. Chapter 6 presents the simulation model and results. Conclusions are drawn
in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK

In this chapter, we briefly discuss the relevant works that have been done till date.

2.1

Prior Research on Spectrum Allocation

In recent years, there have been many works that have used economic models to study
market-like scenarios where spectrum is traded like a commodity considering the temporal
and spatial aspects. A general framework for TRuthful doUble Spectrum aucTions called
TRUST has been introduced in [12]. TRUST is the first truthful double auction which takes
any re-usability-driven spectrum allocation algorithm as the input and applies a novel winner determination and pricing mechanism to determine winning sellers and buyers. TRUST
achieves the three economic properties: truthfulness, individual rationality, and ex-post budget balance. TRUST follows the McAfee model [13], which guarantees the three economics
properties but does not consider the spectrum re-use. However, TRUST is a single channel
auction and assumes that the interference conditions of a buyer are known to the auctioneer.
In [14] a DOuble Truthful Auction for dynamic spectrum access (DOTA) was proposed.
DOTA provided more flexible spectrum bidding than TRUST by allowing both buyer and
seller to request/sell multi-channel. DOTA acheives that by translating multi-unit bids into
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an equivalent single-unit bids, and by re-desiging the clearing and pricing rules. However,
DOTA did not consider the channels heterogeneity.
In [15], the first double auction design for spectrum allocation for single band that explicitly decouples the buyer side and seller side auction design was proposed. The main goal
is to achieve truthfulness and budget-balancing. By using the concept of graph partitioning
and subgraphs, it reduces the randomness of independent set construction. Moreover, the
partitioning provides the ability to compute prices in each subgraph independently, which
achieves higher revenue. Finally, a merge strategy combines the auction results. The overall
performance is better than TRUST, but it consumes more processing time for partitioning
and merging strategies. A double auction called PROMISE was proposed in [16] considers
the economic properties, and re-usability. The main feature of PROMISE is profit maximizing without requiring the knowledge of the valuation which uses a technique called cross
extraction to compute the group’s bid. PROMISE also handles single band with no consideration of heterogeneity. A framework for TRUthful doublE Multi-Channel Spectrum Auctions
(True-MCSA) was proposed in [17], where each seller and buyer have the ability to ask/bid
for arbitrary number of channels. Using the virtual buyer group (VBG) concept, splitting
and bidding are applied to determine the winners. However, all channels are assumed to be
homogeneous and available to all the buyers. While all the above techniques are designed for
global markets, a double auction for local markets with and without the knowledge of bid
distributions was proposed in [18]. The study in [19] used a portfolio optimization framework
to solve the trading decision making problem.
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For an online environment, a general framework called Truthful Online Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation (TODA) was proposed in [20]. A complete graph is used as the
conflict model among secondary users. Though a complete graph makes the auction design
easier, it does not mimic practical scenarios and spectrum reuse. Moreover, TODA only
considers homogeneous spectrum. Research in [21] considered the location of the buyers in
the auction process and proposed a Location-aware Online Truthful doUble auction Scheme
(LOTUS). It introduced the concept of “interference discount”, and uses it to markdown
a bid with a wide range of interference. The auctioneer considered all buyers as long as
their discounted bid is greater than their opportunity cost. The simulation results show that
LOTUS improved system utility and spectrum utilization. In [22] a Truthful double Auction
scheme for HEterogeneous Spectrum (TAHES) was proposed that only considers only a single channel. TAHES allowed buyers to explicitly express their preferences for heterogeneous
spectrum and acheived the economic properties. Multiple channels with heteroginity is considered in TDAMH [23]. Though TDAMH is the most complete truthful double auction, it
does not consider the preferences for the channels from the buyers’ perspective.
In Table 2.1, we compare the most popular double auctions for DSA networks with
respect to the all three economic properties, single/multi channel, channel heterogeneity, and
buyers’ preferences for channels. Our proposed double auction, PreDA, considers all that
TDAMH consideres but also incorporates the buyers’ preferences for the channels. Hence, we
compare the performance PreDA to that of TDAMH using simulation experiments discussed
later.
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Table 2.1 Comparison of existing double auctions.
Double
Truthfulness
Auctions
TRUST [12]
X
DOTA [14]
X
PROMISE [16]
X
AUCTION [15]
X
TRUE-MCSA [17]
X
TODA [20]
X
LOUTS [24]
X
TAHES [22]
X
TDAMH [23]
X
PreDA
X

2.2

Individual Ex-post Budget
Rationality
Balance
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Multi
Channel
Channel
Channel Heterogeneity Preferences
×
×
×
X
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
X
×
×
×
×
×
X
X
×
×
X
X
X
X
×
X
X
X

Prior Research on Spectrum Pricing

The research in [25] addresses the problem of spectrum pricing in cognitive radio network
using a game theoretic model. The competition is formulated as an oligopoly market in which
the firms adjust their prices dynamically to gain the maximum profit. For the primary user,
the cost of sharing the spectrum with the secondary user has been calculated as a function
of the QoS performance degradation of the primary connections. A utility function is used
to obtain the spectrum demand function for the secondary users. The research analyzed
the problem as a Bertrand game and obtained the Nash equilibrium to reach the optimal
pricing.
Research in [26] analyzes the optimal price setting for the service provider by examining the balance between the subscribers and the secondary buyers in a content-redistribution
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network. The behavior between the subscribers and the secondary has been modeled as a
hybrid Stackelberg auction game. This kind of analysis can help the service providers reserve
their profit and improve the quality of service for end users.
Research in [27] presented two approaches to solve the interference and reliability
problems: partitioning approach and conflict graph approach. The proposed dynamic spectrum auction considers both space and time properties of the spectrum. A conflict graph
based on measurement-calibrated propagation models was presented in [28], which removed
the need for exhaustive signal measurements by interpolating signal strengths using calibrated models. The results show that those estimated conflict graphs improve reliability
by reducing the impact of accumulative interference at the cost of some spectrum utilization loss. A real time spectrum auction framework to maximize the auction revenue and
spectrum utilization, with conflict-free spectrum allocations was proposed in [29]. It introduced a bidding language, an auction algorithm, and pricing models to control trade-offs
between revenue and fairness. It revealed that in order to maximize revenue and spectrum
utilization, pricing must be calculated based on local demand and availability of the resources. A novel distributed collusion mechanism to allocate channels in the spectrum pool
with graph coloring and bidding theory has been proposed in [30]. The overall utility of
both primary and secondary users have been measured via a simulations which showed that
the proposed scheme has the overall performance similar to the optimal one. The concept
of spectrum micro-trading to enable trading of spectrum on the micro-scale has been discussed in [31]. The study focused on three dimensions: the micro-spatial, micro-temporal,
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and micro-frequency scales. The results show that the spectrum utilization can be greatly
improved. An auction-based mechanism multi-auctioneer progressive auction for dynamic
spectrum access was proposed in [26] where each primary user systematically raises the
trading prices and each secondary user consequently decides whether to buy a spectrum
band or not. The equilibrium is defined as the state that no seller and bidder would like
to deviate from their decision. The results show that the performance is arbitrary close to
the global optimal. However, the concept of the spectrum reuse was not considered. Two
auctions for mobility and interference support was designed in [32] using two-dimensional
bids. The auctions take the and allocate the channel exclusively and non-exclusively, for the
single-channel and multiple-channel respectively. As a result, a channel is either exploited
or simultaneously reused without interference. Auctions have also been used for routing [33]
and scheduling [34] in cognitive radio networks.

2.3

Prior Research on Economic Models for Routing

A unicast routing protocol with selfish nodes has been introduced in [35], where all nodes
are considered rational as they always choose a strategy that maximizes their benefit. Each
node declares a cost for forwarding a unit of data. As a result, when a node sends data to the
destination, it does two main operations: computes the least cost path to the destination,
and then computes a fee for each node on this path. This pricing scheme shows that the
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profit of each node is maximized when it declares its true cost. Declaration of ‘true’ costs
has been addressed in [36].
As far as routing in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) are concerned, each node
has its own authority, so unconditionally forwarding packets for other nodes, cannot be
guaranteed. In order to induce nodes to forwarding packets, incentives must be provided.
Such a pricing mechanism in the form of dynamic games for routing in MANETs has been
presented in [37]. The authors in [38] develop a route selection algorithm with minimum
payment, and at the same time guarantees truthful cost reporting by secondary users. This
problem has been formulated as finding the least-priced path without and with link capacity constraints. Two algorithms have been proposed: a polynomial-time algorithm to
find the truthful low-priced path that efficiently calculates its truthful price, and a payment
materialization algorithm to guarantee truthful capacity reporting by secondary users.
In [39], a pricing based routing scheme is proposed that stimulates cooperation among
users so that they forward each others packets. Through an iterative price adaptation algorithm, spectrum is allocated for the route selected. A session-based spectrum trading
mechanism based on the cross-layer optimization was proposed in [40]. A secondary service
provider (SSP) selects the paths considering various parameters including the price of bands,
primary activity, flow routing, and link scheduling. A routing algorithm based on spectrum
trading and spectrum competition that considers the different QoS levels for unlicensed users
is proposed in [41]. Routes are decided based on factors such as user profiles, number of hops,
channel identification, neighbor identification, probabilities of idle slots and primary activity.
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Though the price for spectrum trade was computed based on what a secondary wants, it
does not consider the price already paid to acquire the spectrum from primaries.
An auction-based route allocation (ARA) scheme for routing protocol in mobile adhoc networks (MANETs) has been proposed in [42] that prolongs the lifetime of MANETs.
In ARA, message routes are determined by auctions between message transmitters and forwarders. The senders have the ability to adjust the route based on the auctions conducted
at nodes along the route. Though ARA can prolong the network lifetime, there are unresolved issues, such as bidding strategies and their influences on the ARA. An auction-based
incentive scheme called Incentive comPatible Auction-based Service Scheme (iPass) to increase cooperation for packet forwarding in MANETs has been proposed in [24]. Each router
runs an auction to determine which node should obtain how much bandwidth and at what
price. The set of the traffic passing through router are the bidders. Each flow carries a
bid representing its willingness to pay to get the resource. The method is based on the
generalized Vickrey auction with reserve pricing. iPass has shown be fair and efficient. The
work in [43] studied auction based schemes for multi-path routing in selfish networks. A
general model known as optimal auction-based multi-path routing (OAMR) has been developed based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. Also, a sequential auction-based
multi path routing (SAMR) has been proposed. SAMR has different sequencing strategies
than OAMR, which reduce the computational time and can run in real-time. Moreover, an
algorithm has been applied that assigns the traffic of a request among its available paths
and determines the payment. Results show that OAMR or SAMR can reach the destination
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node with lower payment-cost ratio, compared to other schemes. For multiple requests with
selfish nodes, OAMR can guarantee truthfulness and efficiency, while SAMR is truth-telling
and efficient only for the case of a single request.
A combination of both auction and game theoretic based routing algorithm was presented in [44]. Two different ways of bidding have been considered: a modified first and
a second-price sealed-bid. Both mechanisms have been proved to work well in terms of
general revenue and overall system efficiency. The best route in the proposed algorithm is
based on three parameters: total price, amount of compensation, and power consumption.
A cross-layer opportunistic spectrum access and dynamic routing algorithm, called ROSA,
for cognitive radio networks has been is proposed in [45]. The main goal of ROSA is to maximize the throughput and allocate resources efficiently in a cross-layered fashion, by jointly
addressing routing, dynamic spectrum allocation, scheduling, and transmit power control.
The algorithm maximizes the capacity of links without generating harmful interference to
other users while guaranteeing a bounded bit error rate for the receiver. Also, the algorithm
gives priority to higher capacity links with a high differential backlog to stabilize the system.
ROSA has been shown to outperform simpler solutions for inelastic traffic.

2.4

Prior Research on Opportunistic Scheduling

Opportunistic scheduling is a class of scheduling schemes where the physical layer properties
(i.e., the wireless channel characteristics) are exploited. For example, in a time division
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system, the user with the best channel condition is selected for transmission. Opportunistic
scheduling strategy exploits multiuser diversity and maximizes the overall throughput, which
might be unfair to users with low long-term SINR. To strike a balance between throughput
and fairness, proportional fair (PF) scheduling has been proposed in [46]. Many other
scheduling policies have been proposed and analyzed (see [47] and references therein). Most
of these scheduling policies are sensitive to flow-level dynamics. For example, in a PF
scheduler, a user is selected based on his current average throughput [46].
In [48], two optimal schedulers with exponential complexity were proposed. The
first one maximized the network throughput while the second one minimized scheduling
delay. Then two suboptimal schedulers, referred to as maximum frequency selection (MFS)
and probabilistic frequency selection (PFS), were proposed. A queue-aware frame-based
opportunistic spectrum scheduling scheme was proposed in [49]. A user uses its queue status
and channel conditions to calculate its expected throughput for each channel over the frame.
The main goal of the proposed scheduling scheme was to maximize the overall throughput.
As a result, the channels are assigned to the users with the highest expected throughput.
The proposed scheme tried to handle the fast changing channel conditions by using the
queues. However, this technique increased the overhead of the scheduling process since it
is slot-based scheduling. Also, there is no re-use of the channel in the frame. Study in
[50] also proposed a queuing framework to study the performance of opportunistic spectrum
access by cognitive radio users. However, it did not consider the mobility of cognitive radio
users across network boundaries. Also, there is no sharing for the frequency. Multi-channel
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time slot assignment problem in cognitive radio sensor networks was studied in [51] as an
integer linear program where the goal was to minimize the number of slots in the schedule and
increase the network throughput offered to sensor nodes. An Opportunistic centralized TIme
slot assignment in COgnitive Radio sensor networks (OTICOR) was proposed in [52] which
also used integer linear programming formulation for the MAC-layer scheduling problem
and introduced an optimal schedule. Then a distributed heuristic scheduling schema was
proposed which showed very close results to the optimal one in terms of schedule length.
However, the results were valid for a small network and did not involve mobility of the
nodes. A spectrum allocation algorithm for heterogeneous cognitive radio networks was
proposed in [53]. However, the study was done under imperfect sensing, where the sensing
time had no effect on the system performance.
Study in [54] proposed a Distributed TDMA based MAC protocol (DTMDD) for
data dissemination in multi-hop ad-hoc cognitive radio networks. The objectives of this
study were ensuring message reachability and avoiding collision among secondary users. A
SU selected the best channel based on an intelligent selection strategy. In [55], a scheduling
problem called Maximizing the Number of Satisfied Users (MNSU) was proposed to maximize
throughput. Two heuristics were proposed: 1) best first resource assignment and 2) resource
assignment with partial backtracking. However, this study focused on centralized cognitive
radio network and not a distributed one. Research in [56] provided an opportunistic channel
access scheme with channel ordering and periodic sensing. The SUs first select the k best
primary channels out of N . They sense these k channels for transmission opportunity,
21

and then probes the idle channel for channel quality measurement. However, the reward
value, which is the average throughput, is calculated based on the values of threshold and
transmission period only.
Various overlay spectrum access schemes in cooperative cognitive radio networks were
reviewed in [57]. In the overlay techniques, secondary users can access the resources only
when primary users are not using them. Similarly, [58] provided a survey of underlay techniques for resource allocation in cognitive radio networks. The underlay model allows both
primary and secondary users to access the spectrum simultaneously. Moreover, switching
between the overlay and underlay transmission modes is possible. A hybrid overlay-underlay
model was proposed in [59].
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CHAPTER 3: AUCTION-BASED CHANNEL ALLOCATION
IN DSA NETWORKS

In this chapter, we briefly deliberate the theories that are used in this research. Then discuss
auction-based channel allocation techniques.

3.1

Basics of Auction Theory

Auction theory is an applied branch of economics which deals with how sellers and buyers
trade goods in a market. Oftentimes, the price of the good being traded is uncertain and
putting up such goods for an auction reveals the true value of the good. Auction design
considers the efficiency, optimal and equilibrium bidding strategies, and revenue. Generally,
there are many types of auctions [60]:

• Auctions can be single dimensional or multi-dimensional. In a single dimensional
auction, the bidding process focuses on the price offered for a good, while in the
multi-dimensional auction, the bidding process considers other things such as quality
and timeliness.
• Auctions can be one-sided or two-sided. In one-sided auction, bidders are either buyers
or sellers and the main task of the auctioneer is to decide the winning bid. In two-sided
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auction both buyers and sellers submit bids and the job of the auctioneer is to match
buyers to sellers.
• Auctions can be open-cry or sealed bid. In the open-cry auction every bidder has an
ability to hear/know other bids while in the sealed bid only the auctioneer has this
right.
• Auctions can be first price or kth price. In the first price auction, the winner pays its
winning bid, while in the kth price the winner pays the price of the bid that is ranked
kth. The second price auction is a famous example of the kth price auction, where the
winner pays the price bid by the second-highest bidder.
• Auctions can be single-unit or multi-unit of the same commodity. In the single-unit
auction, the bidder is allowed to bid for only a single good, either a single item or
multiple items collected together. In the multi-unit auction the bidder has an ability
to bid for several units together.
• Auctions can be single-item or multi-item (i.e., combinatorial auction). In a combinatorial auction, multiple heterogeneous goods are auctioned at the same time. Also
bidders have the option to bid for any combinations of goods, which gives a bidder the
chance to check for various bundles of items.
• English auction: It is single dimensional, one-sided and usually sell-side, open-cry, and
first price auction. Additionally, the bids are made in ascending order, and the seller
might set a reserve price where no sale is made below this price [60, 61].
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• Dutch auction: It is a single-dimensional, one sided, open-cry, first price auction. There
could be a reserve price. The main difference between Dutch and English auctions is
that the bids are descending rather than ascending [62].
• Sealed first-price auction. Bidders have to submit their private, sealed, bids before a
deadline. Then auctioneer opens the sealed bids and determines the winner. Normally
the winner is a bidder with the highest bid, and the winner pays either the first or
the kth price. The sealed-bid second-price auction is called Vickrey auction. The
main advantage of the Vickrey auctions is solving the collusion problem. In this kind
of auction, bidders try their best to bid the best estimate of the value of the good
because they will pay the second highest bid.
English, Dutch, first-price sealed bid, and second price sealed bid have been shown
to generate the same expected revenue using the revenue equivalence theorem (RET) [63].

3.2

Single Auction-Based Channel Allocation

We consider a dynamic spectrum access network with multiple secondary users and multiple
primary users, randomly scattered over an area. Each primary user owns a spectrum band
which represents a channel. We assume that the bandwidth of each such band is identical
(e.g., all TV bands in the US are 6 MHz each). However, the price paid by the primary user
to acquire their respective band is different which we assume to be a private information
known only to the primary buyer.
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As far as the secondary users are concerned, they buy the bands from the primaries.
However, the quality of the bands varies due to the spatial and temporal reasons– and as a
result, a secondary user will be willing to pay more for a better quality channel. A secondary
user can easily sort the available channels based on their preference. We use SINR as a metric
to determine the goodness of a channel. Thus, each secondary user will have a preference
list of channels sorted in a descending order such that preference for channel l is higher than
or equal to the preference for channel k, for l < k
Secondary user i, represented by SUi , determines a price that he is willing to pay for
channel j, which is uniquely owned by primary user j, represented by P Uj . Let that price
be denoted by pji . The prices are also sorted in the descending order such that the highest
price is for the most preferred channel and so on. Thus, we have multi-bids from the same
SU.
We model the spectrum allocation process as a multi-bid auction where PUs are the
sellers and SUs are the buyers placing multiple bids. Typically, the auctioneer who controls
the auction tries to maximize the revenue. However, other aspects like social welfare might
be taken into consideration which might not maximize the revenue.
The utility of SUi , represented by Uis , can be calculated as:

Uis =





vij − p∗i

if SUi is a winner;




0

otherwise.

(3.1)
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where vij is the valuation of channel j by SUi , i.e., the maximum price SUi is willing to pay
for channel j, and p∗i is the bid. The SUs that are able to eventually buy a channel is said
to be a winner.
Similarly, the utility of the j t h primary seller, represented by Ujp ,, is defined as:

Ujp =





p∗i

if P Uj is able to sell;




0

otherwise.

(3.2)

where p∗i is the price that the winning SU paid to P Uj for channel j. The utility of PU is
the summation of all price paid from SU to allocate a channel.
SUs interfere with each other if they use the same channel and are in close proximity
of each other. Thus, we use an interference graph that gives the conflict of every SU. In the
graph, an edge between nodes i and j means that they are close to each other and therefore
cannot use the same channel at the same time. However, a specific channel can be sold
to (and consequently used by) multiple SU simultaneously as long as they do not interfere
with each other. Such simultaneous re-use of channels increases the i) spatial utilization
of the spectrum and ii) revenue for the primaries. Next, we explain how to calculate the
interference and preference list.

27

3.2.1

SINR and Preference List

Each secondary user computes its preference list based on SINR on each channel. The
interference experienced by a secondary user on a particular channel is different due to the
other users at varying distances who are also using that channel. There are two types of
users who are responsible for creating the interferences– the primary and the secondaries.
Note, for any channel, there could be only one primary but multiple secondaries that use
the same channel.
The interference between secondary user i and primary user j on channel j is calculated as:
p
Ii,j
=

Pp
dαi,j

(3.3)

where Pp is the transmit power from the primary j, di,j is the distance between users i and
j, and α is the path loss exponent. We assume all primaries transmit with power Pp .
The interference between secondary user i and all other secondary users on channel
j is calculated as:
s
Ii,j
=

X Ps
dαi,n
n∈N

(3.4)

i

where n ∈ Ni are the neighbors of node i using channel j. Ps is the transmit power from
any secondary, and di,n is the distance between nodes i and n.
As a result, interference perceived at secondary node i on channel j from all interfering
sources can be calculated as:
p
s
Ii,j = Ii,j
+ Ii,j
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(3.5)

With the interference known, we find the SIN R for secondary node i on channel j
as:
SIN Ri,j =

Ps
dα
i,t

n0 + Ii,j

(3.6)

where n0 is the background noise, and di,t is the distance between receiver i and transmitter
t.
The SINR on all the channels for secondary node i can be written in the form of a
vector:
SIN Ri = [SIN Ri,1 , SIN Ri,2 , · · · , SIN Ri,K ]

where K is the total number of channels.
The secondary node i sorts the SINR vector in descending order and uses it as a
preference list for the channel(s) to be bought.

3.2.2

Multi-bid Auction

With the preferences for the channels known, the SUs can bid for the channels. Obviously,
the SUs will be willing to pay more for a preferred channel than a non-preferred channel–
thus, the bids will be non-increasing for that SU’s preference list i.e., the highest bid will be
for the most preferred channel and so on.
As for the auctioneer, the first step is to find the interference conflict graph such that
the same channel is not allocated to two SUs that interfere with each other. The auctioneer
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starts with the preference list of any secondary user i, which is actually a tuple containing
the channel number and the corresponding bid. It checks if the most preferred channel of
user i is also the most preferred channel of any of his neighbor(s). If there is a conflict, the
corresponding bids are compared, and the user that has the highest bid is allocated that
channel. If user i wins his most preferred channel, then the auctioneer moves to another user
and repeats the process. If user i does not get the most preferred channel (i.e., it loses to one
of his neighbors) then the second most preferred channel is considered for allocation. Again,
the bids for that channel is compared from the neighbors and the one with the highest bid
gets the channel. As the process continues, node i might win one of the channels from its
preferred list, or it might not win any and remain channel-less.
The allocation of channels via this auction process might result in i) a channel not
being allocated to any user, ii) a user not getting any channel, and iii) a channel being
shared by multiple non-conflicting users. Here the objective of the auction is not revenue
maximization but satisfaction of the users in acquiring their preferred channels.
It is to be noted that most auctions try to maximize the revenue. Likewise, the
primaries would like to adopt auction strategies that would maximize their revenue. However,
there might be other constraints imposed by the regulatory authority. For example, to
induce a competitive market, it is desired that there are at least a certain number of wireless
providers in a geographical area so as to have an oligopoly market. Thus, apart from revenue
maximization, other aspects are also taken into consideration, which in our case is the
preference for bands.
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3.2.2.1

Fairness

In order to determine whether the SUs are receiving a fair share of the spectrum bands, we
used a popular metric– the Jain’s fairness index. First, we compute the achievable bit rate
for each SU using Shannon’s capacity:

bi = B ∗ log(1 + SIN Ri.j )

(3.7)

where bi is the achievable bit rate for SU i, B is the bandwidth of a channel and, SIN Ri,j
is the interference for SU i on channel j. The bit rate for the whole system can be found by
adding the individual bit rates for all n SUs, i.e.,

Pn

i=1 bi .

The Jain’s fairness index is obtained as:

P
( ni=1 bi )2
J (x1 , x2 , .....xn ) = Pn 2
n. i=1 bi

The index varies from

1
n

(3.8)

(worst case) to 1 (best case) and it is maximum when all SUs receive

the same allocation.

3.2.2.2

An Illustrative Example

In Fig. 3.1 we show the conflict graph of a simple network with 6 nodes labelled A through
F . We consider that there are 8 primaries and hence 8 channels numbered from 1 through
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8. For each node, the preference list (shown as ‘PL’ in the figure) of channels and their
corresponding bids are also shown. Note, channels 1 and 5 are not in any PL as they conflict
with all. Also, the number of channels in the PL varies from node to node.
Suppose the auctioneer starts with node B. The most preferred channel is 6– which
happens to be the most preferred channel of nodes A and F as well. Since the bid from node
B (i.e., 89) is not the highest among its neighbors, it does not get channel 6. Then its second
most preferred channel is considered (i.e., channel 2). Channel 2 is not the most preferred
channel for B’s neighbors. As a result, there is no conflict, and channel 2 is allocated to
node B. Then the auctioneer moves to the next node, let’s say node A. The most preferred
channel for node A is channel 6, which happens to be the most preferred channel of node
F as well. Again the bid from node A for channel 6 (i.e., 89) is less than its neighbor F.
Then the auctioneer checks the second most preferred channel (i.e., channel 2). Channel 2
has already been allocated to node B. Then the auctioneer checks the third most preferred
channel (i.e., channel 8). Node A is allocated channel 8, since there is no conflict among
its neighbors. Then the auctioneer moves to the node F. Node F with the highest bid for
channel 6 is allocated channel 6. Then the auctioneer moves to the next node, let’s say
node C. The most preferred channel is 8, which happens to be the most preferred channel
of nodes E and D as well. Since the bid from node C (i.e., 92) is not the highest among its
neighbors, it does not get channel 8 or any other channels because there is only one channel
in the preference list. Next node is node E with most preferred channel 8, which happens
to be the most preferred channel of nodes C and D as well. Since the bid from node E (i.e.,
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83) is not the highest among its neighbors, it does not get channel 8, then its second most
preferred channel is considered (i.e., channel 7). Node E is allocated channel 7 since there
is no conflicts among its neighbors. Node D with the highest bid for channel 8 is allocated
channel 8. The outcome of the auction is shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Auction Results
Node
A
B
C
D
E
F
Channel
8
2
8
7
6
Bit Rate 6.598 6.402 0 6.456 5.891 6.679

It can be seen from the allocation that there could a situation where a node does not
get any channel e.g., node C. On the other hand, there could be spatial reuse of a channel
e.g., channel 8 used by non-conflicting nodes A and D. The Jain’s fairness index for this
allocation is 0.83.

PL={6, 2}
Bids={89, 59}

PL={8}
Bids={92}

B
PL={6, 2, 8, 3} A
Bids={89, 55, 53, 50}

C
D PL={8, 4, 7}
Bids={98, 96, 94}

F

E
PL={8, 7, 2}
Bids={83, 59, 57}

PL={6, 2}
Bids={92, 88}

Figure 3.1 Conflict graph with preference list (PL) and bids
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3.3

Double Auction-Based Channel Allocation

Double auction is different from single auction– here, rational sellers also participate in the
auction process. Generally, there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers. In the first stage,
sellers submit their ‘asks’ to an auctioneer who at the same time receives ‘bids’ from the
buyers. The auctioneer generates market-clearing prices based on all bids, then determines
the winners. However, the Impossibility Theorem [64] illustrates that no double auction
can simultaneously achieve all three economic properties: i) truthfulness, ii) individual rationality, and iii) budget balance while maximizing auction efficiency. As a result, we focus
on satisfying these economic properties first, and then try to maximize the efficiency. We
propose PreDA– a preference-based truthful double auction for dynamic spectrum access
(DSA) networks. We consider a dynamic spectrum access network with M primary users
(i.e., the sellers) and N secondary users (i.e., the buyers) randomly scattered over an area.
Each primary user owns a channel– the bandwidth of channel is identical (e.g., all TV channels in the US are 6 MHz each). Each channel is divided into an equal number of bands u.
The number of un-used bands for channel i is ui such that 0 ≤ ui ≤ u, i.e., the number of
bands to be sold vary from seller to seller. For example, a 6 MHz channel can be divided
into 6 bands of 1 MHz each.
As far as the secondary users (SUs) are concerned, they buy bands from the channels
that primaries own. However, the quality of the channels varies due to the spatial and
temporal reasons– and as a result, a secondary user will be willing to pay more for a better
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quality channel. A secondary user can easily sort the available channels based on their
preference. We use SINR as a metric to determine the goodness of a channel. Thus, each
secondary user will have a preference list of channels sorted in a descending order. However,
there is no preference among the bands from the same channel.
SUs interfere with each other if they use the bands from same channel and are in
close proximity of each other. Thus, we use an interference graph that gives the conflict
of every SU. In the graph, an edge between nodes i and j means that they are close to
each other and therefore cannot use the same channel (even if bands are different) at the
same time. However, a specific band can be sold to (and consequently used by) multiple SU
simultaneously as long as they do not interfere with each other. Such simultaneous re-use of
bands increases the i) spatial utilization of the spectrum and ii) revenue for the primaries.

3.3.1

Bid notations

A seller i submits its ‘ask’ denoted as:
"

#

Si = Bis ui

(3.9)

where Bis is the ‘asking price’ for each band and ui is the number of bands to be sold. Let
Vis be the true valuation of each band, and Pis is the actual payment received for selling a
band. Thus, the utility for seller i, represented by Uis is calculated as:
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Uis

=





Pis − Vis

if i is a able to sell




0

otherwise.

(3.10)

Similarly, buyer j submits its ‘bid’ as:
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 Bj,1 
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 j,2 






Bj =  ... 







 ... 




b
Bj,m

(3.11)

T


b
b
where the column vector Bj,1
, · · · , Bj,m

, 1 ≤ m ≤ M , is the bid list which contains

the price the buyer is willing to pay for the bands the corresponding channels for listed in
descending order of preference (namely, the preference list) denoted as the column vector

T
Ch1 , · · · , Chm , and Dj is the number of bands buyer j wants to buy. To clarify, buyer j
b
is willing to pay Bj,1
for a band from the most preferred channel Ch1 .

If Vjb is the true valuation of the band, and Pjb is the actual payment made by buyer
j, then the utility, Ujb , is calculated as:

Ujb =





Vjb − Pjb

if j is able to buy




0

otherwise.

(3.12)
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3.3.2

SINR and Preference List

Each secondary user computes its preference list based on SINR on each channel, as discussed
in 3.2.1 The SINR on all the channels for secondary node j can be written in the form of a
vector:
SIN Rj = [SIN Rj,1 , SIN Rj,2 , · · · , SIN Rj,M ]

Recall, M is the total number of channels/sellers.
The secondary node j sorts the SINR vector in descending order and uses it as a
preference list for the channel(s) to be bought.
With the preferences for the channels known, the SUs can bid for the channels.
Obviously, the SUs will be willing to pay more for a preferred channel than a non-preferred
channel– thus, the bids will be non-increasing for that SU’s preference list i.e., the highest
bid will be for the most preferred channel and so on.

3.3.3

Economic Properties

The three economic properties that double auctions typically satisfy are as follows:

1. Truthfulness: A double auction is considered truthful such that no seller i or buyer j
can improve his own utility by bidding untruthfully: Bis 6= Vis orBjb 6= Vjb In some cases,
bidders are selfish, i.e, they may declare dishonest valuation, to increase their own prof37

its. Thus, truthfulness is vital to resist market manipulation and guarantee auction
fairness and efficiency. In truthful auction, the auctioneer can allocate spectrum efficiently to the buyers who value it the most, and also ensures that bidders’ utility will
be maximized only by declaring truthfully without knowing the other bidders’ bids.
2. Individual Rationality: Bidders get non-negative utilities, i.e., no winning seller is
paid less than his ask and no winning buyer pays more than bid:
Pis ≥ Bis , Pjb 6 Bjb ∀ seller i, buyer j
3. Ex-post Budget Balance: A double auction is considered an ex-post budget balance
auction if the auctioneers’ profit is non-negative, i.e, Φ ≥ 0. That means, the total
amount paid to the sellers is no more than the total amount received from the buyers:
Φ=

3.3.4

PN

j=1

Pjb −

PM

i=1

Pis ≥ 0.

PreDA

PreDA is a multi-round multi-unit double auction where the buyers place multiple bids for
heterogeneous channels. The 5-step auction is controlled by an auctioneer.
Step I: Buyer Group Formation
The first step for the auctioneer is to form the buyers’ group with a bid-independent
method. The bid-independent group formation is helpful to maintain truthfulness and prevent buyers’ bid manipulation [12, 23]. The buyers group formation process is modeled as
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finding the sets of non-interfering users who can can transmit on the same channel at the
same time. Of course, non-interfering users can transmit on different channels at the same
time. Therefore, we identify sets of non-interfering users who are placed in non-interfering
sets. The problem of finding such non-interfering sets for an arbitrary network is known to
be NP-complete.
SUs interfere with each other if they use the same channel and are within the transmission range of each other. Thus, we use an interference graph that gives the conflict of
every SU. In the graph, an edge between nodes i and j means that they are close to each
other and therefore can not use the same channel at the same time. However, the channel
can be simultaneously used by nodes that belong to different sets since they do not interfere
with each other.
We start with the entire network represented by graph (G) We start with a node
called n1 and place it in the first non-interfering set, represented by G1 . (Note, G1 is a set,
not a graph.) The selection of n1 could be based on any criteria. We discuss and implement
three such criteria in section 6.2. All neighbors of n1 in the interference conflict graph cannot
be placed G1 . Therefore, we remove all such nodes and their edges from (G) to obtained
(G 0 ). Note that, no node in (G 0 )interferes with G1 . We follow the same process of finding a
node in (G 0 ) (say n2 ) and place it in G1 . We further reduce (G 0 ) and continue to find nodes
that would belong to G1 till the graph reduces to a null set. This set of nodes belong to
non-interfering set G1 .
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With the set of nodes placed in G1 , we proceed to find the next non-interfering set
from nodes that are in (G)−G1 . We follow the same process and obtain the second noninterfering set, G2 . Then we consider the remaining nodes in (G)−G1 − G2 and continue in
the same manner till all nodes belong to some non-interfering set.
Step II: Virtual Group Formation
Once the groups are formed, we check for the buyers’ demand, their preference for
channels, and the corresponding bids. In case, a buyer’s demand is more than 1 band, then
his request cannot be satisfied by simply putting the buyer in one group. As a result, we
divide each group into multiple Virtual Groups (VG). The demand of each VG is exactly
1 band for a specific seller. Though there are various methods that have been proposed to
create VGs, none consider the channel preference for buyers. Creating the VGs consists of
two parts.
Part I: Bid creation: The auctioneer starts with a group G1 , and starts to create a pair of
bid for all buyers in G1 . The pair of bid contains the most preferred channel for a buyer and
the corresponding bid. For a buyer j in G1 , the pair of bid contains the maximum bid, for
the most preferred channel (i.e., the first bid and the first channel). This pair is submitted
as a bid for buyer j, for first round of the auction. Part I is repeated for all buyers in G1 .
The same process is repeated for all the groups. For the second round, the second most
preferred channel and its bid is considered. The process continues till the last round.
Part II: VG creation: The auctioneer starts to create the VGs for channel/seller 1 ≤ i ≤ M .
For seller i:
40

• If demand for seller i is 0, there is no VG for i.
• If there is a demand for seller i, the buyer with the minimum per unit bid in the group
is found and eliminated from any VG for seller i. It can be noted, [12] did not support
the elimination process which guarantees truthfulness, as we charge the winners the
bids of the eliminated buyer for seller i.
• The VGs are created for all buyers who are not eliminated for seller i. The demand of
each VG is 1 unit only.
• The bid of a VG for seller i is the bid of the eliminated buyer (i.e., the minimum bid)
multiplied by the number of buyers in that VG.

Step III: Winner Determination
Let V G1 , V G2 , · · · , V GV represent V groups formed in Step II for round r. Any
virtual group V Gv has Bv = |V Gv | buyers. Suppose, the bid of the eliminated buyer j is
Bjb =Bmin . The virtual group bids πv is:

πv = Bmin × Bv

(3.13)

In this step, the auctioneer determines the winning VGs and the winning sellers.
Similar to any traditional double auction, all VGs are sorted in a non-increasing order based
on their bids, (i.e. π1 ≥ π2 ≥ · · · ≥ πV ). While all sellers are sorted in a non-decreasing
s
order based on their asks, (i.e. B1s ≤ B2s ≤ · · · ≤ BM
). Ties can be broken arbitrarily.
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The auctioneer starts from the maximum VG bids and tries to match it to the suitable
seller, and continues to do so till the last VG. No seller sells for anything less than the asking
price.
Step IV: Payment Calculation
All buyers in the winning group V Gi equally share the payment πv of winning, while
each winning seller i gets exactly its asking price Bis . The difference between πv and Bis goes
to the auctioneer. No charge or payment is made to the losing sellers and buyers. Thus, the
auctioneer’s profit is:
Φ=

V,M
X

(πv − Bis )

(3.14)

v=1,i=1

Step V: New Demand Calculation
The auctioneer calculates the new demand for all winning buyers and winning sellers
(since they still might have demands to be fulfilled) by subtracting the number of allocated
unites from the original demands. In case there is no more demand for any buyer or seller,
that buyer or seller is removed and does not participate in further auction rounds. Else, they
participate in the next round with the new demands.
After Step V, The auctioneer starts the new round of the auction from Step II. The
auction stops when either demands are met or there are no more bands to be sold.
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3.3.5

An Illustrative Example

We demonstrate the working of PreDA using a toy example. We consider 6 sellers whose
asking price for the bands to be sold are shown in Table 3.2. There are 9 buyers whose
conflicts are shown in Fig 3.2. Their bid list, preference list, and demands (D) are shown in
Table 3.3.
Table 3.2 Sellers’ Asks
Seller Asking Price
1
$5
2
$6
3
$3
4
$7
5
$5
6
$3

B1

B3

Units
3
2
1
2
5
2

B2

B5

B6

B4

B8

B9

B7

Figure 3.2 Buyers’ Conflict Graph

Step I: For the Group formation, we start with B1 in the first group called G1 . Nodes
that do not conflict with B1 are included in G1 i.e., G1 = (B1, B2, B4, B6, B7). Similarly,
we get the second group as G2 i.e., G2 = (B3, B5, B8, B9). Since all the buyers have been
accommodated in a group, there will be no more groups.
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Table 3.3 Buyers’ Bids
Buyers
Bid List
B1
[$5,$2,$1]
B2
[$7,$6,$5]
B3
[$4,$3]
B4
[$5,$3,$2]
B5
[$8,$7]
B6
[$4,$3,$2]
B7
[$10,$5,$2]
B8
[$7,$6]
B9
[$8,$6,$5]

Preference List
[1,3,6]
[1,6,4]
[2,6]
[3,6,4]
[3,2]
[4,3,2]
[1,4,3]
[2,6]
[2,6,5]

Demand
2
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
2

Step II: To start with (i.e, Part 1), the bid of each buyer in G1 is created. The bid for B1
is ($5, 1)2 because $5 is the highest bid, the most preferred is channel 1, and the demand is
2. Similarly, the bids for B2, B4, B6, B7 are ($7, 1)3 , ($5, 3)2 , ($4, 4)1 , ($10, 1)1 , respectively.
For G2 the bids are ($1, 2)2 , ($8, 3)2 , ($7, 2)1 , ($8, 2)2 .
To create the Virtual Groups (i.e., Part 2), we start with G1 for all channels. As B1,
B2, and B7 bid for Ch 1, the minimum bid (from B1) is eliminated. Thus, B2 and B7 form
virtual group V G1. The corresponding bid is $10 which is 2 times the minimum bid (i.e.,
the bid of B1) as shown in Table 3.4. As B7 had a demand of 1 band, its requirement has
been met. However, B2 needs 2 more bands (as only 1 band has been met out of the 3 it
demanded for). Thus, V G2 and V G3 are created with B2 only. The bids for both are $5.
The same process is repeated for all the channels that are in demand for G1. Note, since
there is no demand for Ch 2, Ch 5, and Ch 6, they do not appear in virtual groups of G1 .
We do the same for G2 .
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Table 3.4 Step II, Part II
Group

Channel
Ch1

G1
Ch3
Ch4
Ch2
G2
Ch3

VG VG member
VG1
{B2,B7}
VG2
{B2}
VG3
{B2}
VG4
{B4}
VG5
{B4}
VG6
{B6}
VG7
{B8,B9}
VG8
{B9}
VG9
{B5}
VG10
{B5}

Bid
5*2=$10
$5
$5
$5
$5
$4
1*2=$2
$1
$8
$8

Step III: The virtual groups are sorted in a descending order based on the bids as shown in
Fig. 3.3. The sellers ‘asks’ (see Table 3.2) are sorted in ascending order. Starting with the
virtual group from the left, we find the matches over all sellers that can satisfy the price for
the corresponding channel. The matchings are shown by the arrows.

$10

$8

$8

$5

$5

$5

$5

$4

$2

$1

VG1

VG9

VG10

VG2

VG3

VG4

VG5

VG6

VG7

VG8

Ch1

Ch3

Ch3

Ch1

Ch1

Ch3

Ch3

Ch4

Ch2

Ch2

Ch3

Ch6

Ch6

Ch1

Ch1

Ch1

Ch5

Ch5

Ch5

Ch5

Ch5

Ch2

Ch2

Ch4

Ch4

$3

$3

$3

$5

$5

$5

$5

$5

$5

$5

$5

$6

$6

$7

$7

Figure 3.3 Step III: Winner Determination
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Step IV: For each match, the payment to the seller, payment by the buyer, and the auctioneer profit are calculated as shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 Step IV: Payment Calculation
Winners Payment to seller Payment of
VG1-Ch1
$5
B2 pays
B7 pays
VG9-Ch3
$3
B5 pays
VG2-Ch1
$5
B2 pays
VG3-Ch1
$5
B2 pays

buyer Auctioneer profit
$5
$5
$5
$8
$5
$5
$0
$5
$0

Step V: The demands are updated based on what fraction of the demand has been met. For
example, the demand of B1 remains at 2 as it did not get any band, where as the demand of
B2 is 0 as it received the required 3 bands. The demand of B5 is reduced to 1 as it received
1 band of the required 2. The updated demands are shown in Table 3.6. The asking price
for the sellers and the remaining bands to be sold are shown in Table 3.7.
Table 3.6 Buyers’ Updated Demands
Buyers New Demands
B1
2
B2
0
B3
2
B4
2
B5
1
B6
1
B7
0
B8
1
B9
2

Since not all the buyers won their most preferred channel, we still allow them to
participate in the auction for further rounds for them to win their next preferred channel.
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Table 3.7 Sellers’ Updated Units
Seller Asking Units
Price
1
0
2
$6
2
3
0
4
$7
2
5
$5
5
6
$3
2
The same steps are followed but with the demand that has not been made and the residual
bands to be sold. The stopping criteria is discussed in Section 6.2.

3.3.6

Proof of Economic Properties

Theorem 1. PreDA is individual rational for sellers and buyers.
Proof. As per our definition of a “winning” seller, the seller i is paid Pis which is equal
to the asking price Bis , else there is no sale from that seller. Thus, individual rationality
is maintained for the seller. As for the buyers, the bid of the eliminated buyer (i.e., the
minimum bid, Bmin ), is used as the bid for all the buyers in the winning virtual group.
Thus, no winning buyer j pays more than his original bid as: Pjb 6 Bjb , satisfying buyer’s
individual rationality.

Theorem 2. PreDA is ex-budget balanced.
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Proof. Based on the sorting process of the PreDA, all V Gs are sorted in non-increasing
order based on their bids. Thus, the results of winner determination must be as: πv ≥ Pis ,
where πv is the bid of the winner V Gv , Pis is the ask of the winner seller i. As a result,
PV

v=1

πv −

PM

i=1

P
Pis ≥ 0. However, the summation of the winning virtual groups ( Vv=1 πv )

P
b
is equivalent to the summation of the winning buyers ( N
j=1 Pj ), so:
N
X

Pjb

j=1

−

M
X

Pis ≥ 0

i=1

.

Theorem 3. PreDA ensures the truthfulness of the sellers and the buyers.

Proof. We prove truthfulness of the auction by showing that the expected utility does not
increase for the sellers or the buyers by deviating from the true ask or the bid values.
For Sellers: Let us consider that the asks by the sellers are uniformly distributed between
the lowest al and highest ah values. (The assumption on the density function does not
matter; a uniform density makes it easy to prove.) Suppose the true ask is at and a0t is an
untrue ask. Case 1: a0t < at
With a lower asking price, the utility of the winning seller cannot increase as the
sellers get no more than the asking price.
Case 2: a0t > at
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For a seller i to win, the payment Pjb from a buyer j has to be more than or equal
to the asking price Bis . Let the probabilities of winning with at and a0t be P1 and P2
respectively:

P1 = P {at ≥ Pjb } =

ah − at
ah − al

(3.15)

P2 = P {a0t ≥ Pjb } =

ah − a0t
ah − al

(3.16)

As a0t > at , P2 < P1 . Thus, the expected utility (P2 × Pjb ) does not increase from
(P1 × Pjb ). So, no seller can improve its utility by asking untruthfully.
For Buyers: Same as the sellers side, the bids by the sellers are uniformly distributed
between the lowest bl and highest bh values. Suppose the true bid is bt and b0t is an untrue
bid.
Case 1: b0t > bt
With a higher bid, the utility of the winning buyer can not increase, as the buyers
payment is equal to the Bmin . Moreover, the process of group formation is bid-independent,
which is helpful to maintain truthfulness and prevent buyers’ bid manipulation, as mentioned
before.
Case 2: b0t < bt
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The buyer j can still win by bidding less than or equal to the bt , as long as its bid is
greater than or equal to the Bmin . However, even with the winning with b0t the utility of the
winning buyer can not increase since the actual payment is equal to the Bmin .
In case, b0t is less than the Bmin , the buyer definitely loses as the buyer with the
minimum bid is eliminated from the virtual group.
Thus, in all cases, bidding other than the true values can not increase the utilities of
the buyer.
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Algorithm 1 Spectrum Auction
Require:
1: Create the CR Network and denote as G=(V; E)
2: Initialize all PUs and SUs
3: Compute Conflict Graph
4: for all Users do
5:
Calculate Users’ Interference
6:
Calculate Users’ SINR
7:
Generate Users’ Preference List
8:
Generate Users’ Biding List
9: end for
10: Start Auction
11: while Till all users are considered do
12:
Initializing all Flags
13:
Get User’s Neighbor (Conflict Nodes)
14:
if Assignedf lag == 0 then
15:
for all User Preferences do
16:
Check First Preference of the user
17:
if There is only one neighbor and its a PU then
18:
User assigned 1st preference (as PU’s channel cannot be in the list)
19:
Calculate the Revenue for the PU
20:
Change user’s status to assigned user
21:
Auction Round Done, Exit While
22:
end if
23:
if There is a Conflict with another SU and with higher bid than current user’s
bid then
24:
Set Conflict Flag
25:
Move to the next preference, Exit For
26:
end if
27:
if There is a Conflict with already signed SU then
28:
Set Conflict Flag
29:
Move to the next preference, Exit For
30:
end if
31:
end for
32:
if AllConf lictF lags == 0 then
33:
User assigned current preference
34:
Do steps 19-21
35:
end if
36:
end if
37: end while
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CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC MODELS FOR ROUTING IN DSA
NETWORKS

In this chapter, we investigate the routing problem in DSA networks from an economic
perspective. In order for secondary nodes to route packets, they must first acquire spectrum
from primary users which they then sell to others in the form of various services, including
routing of packets. Thus, bandwidth acquired by secondary users are traded amongst each
other as packets get routed. We model the selection of the intermediate nodes in a route using
two different methods: i) a selling price mechanism, and ii) a sealed-bid auction mechanism.
The transmitter explores the cost of forwarding a packet by all potential receivers i.e., the
forwarders. Similarly, a receiver must determine the optimal price for it to route packets on
behalf of other nodes for a certain price. The route with total price is minimum and sustain
the transmitter’s requirement is chosen as a final path.

4.1

Pricing-Based Routing

When a secondary (source) node wants to route packets to a destination node, it must pay
all the intermediate nodes that relay the packets to the destination node. Without such
payments, the intermediate nodes will have no incentive to relay the packets of others as
that would cause resource depletion. Obviously, the source node must seek a path that: i)
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minimizes the total payment to the intermediate nodes and ii) is able to support the target
bit rate as requested by the source node.

The routing problem: (from an economic perspective) is to find a path (or a set of paths)
from a source node s to a destination node d, that has sufficient capacity to route a given
flow, and for which the total payment that needs to be made to relaying nodes is minimized.
To solve the routing problem, we have two decision problems at hand. First, the relay
nodes that sell (also called sellers) the bandwidth must determine the price they must ask
the node that wants to route packets. To do so, the seller must consider the price it already
paid to the primary user to acquire the bandwidth and how much of it has been already sold
(i.e., used by others). Second, the buyer (i.e., the source node) must determine the path(s)
that can sustain its data rate and at the same time minimizes the sum of the payments to
the intermediate nodes involved in the route.

4.1.1

Computation of offered price

We assume that the cost per bandwidth (in Hertz) that the secondary node i pays to the
primary node is picost ; thus for acquiring a bandwidth of Bi , the cost is Bi ×picost . We assume
that node i retains the rights for the spectrum bought indefinitely. Now, secondary node
i sells portions of the acquired bandwidth to various other secondary nodes based on what
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their demands are and what prices they are willing to pay. The chunks of spectrum thus
sold are also for an indefinite time.
We make three assumptions: i) we assume that node i is somehow able to predict
how much bandwidth (Bi ) it must acquire from the primaries, ii) that node i is able to sell
the entire spectrum acquired, and iii) all sales are made one-time i.e., there is no spatial or
temporal reuse of the spectrum chunks. Assumptions (i) and (ii) guarantee that the nodes
are able to generate at-least Bi × picost as revenue.
To sell the spectrum, secondary node i must advertise the optimal price– a higher
price will drive buyers to other sellers and a lower price will result in a loss. We argue
that the advertised/offered price is a function of the fraction of the residual bandwidth (i.e.,
part of the bandwidth that has not yet been sold), which is represented by Bires , where
0 ≤ Bires ≤ 1. We employ the commonly used logarithmic function used for market-driven
bandwidth allocation [14] to determine the price offered by node i and represent it as:

pi = picost (1 − log(Bires ))

(4.1)

This conforms to the fact that when Bires = 0, pi is infinity (i.e., there cannot be any sale) and
when Bires = 1, pi = picost . The offered price as given in equation (4.1) is shown in Fig. 4.1.
The value of picost used is 1. We choose the log function because it decreases quickly from
infinity as Bres increases. Moreover, the log function is mathematically tractable, strictly
concave, and continuously differentiable.
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Figure 4.1 Offered price as a function of residual bandwidth
4.1.2

Determination of noise exposure

Alongside the price offered, the seller must also reveal the quality of the bandwidth that
it is selling, i.e., it must let the buyer know what kind of bit-rate it can achieve with the
bandwidth being sold. It is to be noted that for a given bandwidth, the maximum bit
rate attainable depends on the signal to noise ratio (SNR). Thus, the seller which would be
receiving the packet from the buyer (i.e., transmitter) must compute and truthfully declare
the noise and interference it is exposed to due other nearby nodes. The buyer then, based
on the inter-nodal distance, computes the SNR and the corresponding bit rate.
We assume that the noise exposure of seller node i is due to all its neighbors/interferers.
Two nodes are considered neighbors if they are in the transmission range of each other and
thus can hear each other. We assume that the bi-directional links are symmetric. As a result,
55

noise perceived at node i from all its neighboring nodes can be calculated as:

ni = n0 +

X Pj
dαi,j
j∈N

(4.2)

i

where n0 is the thermal noise, Ni is a set of neighbors of node i, Pj is the transmit power
from node j, di,j is the distance between nodes i and j, and α is the path loss exponent.

4.1.3

Price for buyer

Given the noise obtained from seller i, a transmitter t computes the SNR for node i as:

Pt /dαi,t
SN Rt =
ni

(4.3)

where the transmitter t transmits with power Pt and the distance to the receiver i is di,t .
Let us suppose, the transmitter t wants to achieve a bit rate of bt . In order to do
so, it must buy bandwidth from a seller. Now, the amount of bandwidth to be bought from
seller i would depend on the SNR between nodes t and i as obtained in equation (4.3).
Let Bt,i be the bandwidth required by transmitter t to achieve a bit rate of bt with
receiver node i. It is well know that the maximum achievable bit rate using a bandwidth of
Bt,i can be found using Shannon’s capacity as:

Pt /dαi,t
bt = Bt,i × log(1 +
)
ni
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(4.4)

Alternatively, the transmitter, in order to meet its bit rate requirement, must buy bandwidth
of Bt,i from node i as given by
bt

Bt,i =

log(1 +

Pt /dα
i,t
)
ni

(4.5)

As different sellers exhibit different prices (as given by equation (4.1)), a buyer can
compute the prices for the different sellers and choose the seller for which the cost will be
minimum. Thus, the payment to be made by transmitter (buyer) t is:

payt = arg min(Bt,i × pi )
i

4.1.4

(4.6)

Minimum Cost Route

The cost of the overall path between the source s and the destination d is the sum of the
payment made at each hop. Thus, for path k between s and d, the total cost is

X

costk =

payt

(4.7)

t∈ nodes in path k

The source node chooses the route for which the sum of the prices to the destination node
is minimum. That is, picks path k:

arg min(costk )
i
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(4.8)

The algorithm for min-cost route determination is shown in Algorithm 2.

Algorithm 2 Routing Algorithm
Require: G=(V; E); Source s; destination d randomly among all nodes
1: T otalP rice ← 0, Steps ← 1, Avg(s) ← 0
2: while true do
3:
Sequence[step] ← Current Node
4:
Get Neighbors of the Current Node
5:
Check
1. Knows the route to the destination?
2. Receive multiple copies of same request? Cycle?
3. Disconnected node?
6:
if 1,2,3 then
7:
break
8:
end if
9:
for all Neighbors j ∈ Ni do
10:
OriginalSource ← SourceN ode.ID
11:
N extN odeID←CurrN eighbors[N extGeneration]
12:
CurrP rice
←
Price
between
OriginalSource
CurrN eighbors[N extGeneration]
13:
T otalP rice = T otalP rice + CurrP rice
14:
N extN ode = CurrN ode
15:
Sequence[Steps] = N extN ode → ID
16:
Steps = Steps + 1
17:
Routing(N extN ode, DestinationN ode)
18:
end for
19: end while

4.2

and

Auction Based Routing

We consider a cognitive radio network with multiple secondary cognitive radio nodes randomly scattered over an area as mentioned in section 4.1. We do not consider how the
primaries determine the price of the spectrum when selling to secondaries. Such price func58

tions are usually logarithmic in nature as they are mathematically tractable, strictly concave,
and continuously differentiable. Interested readers can refer to [65] for spectrum price determination by the primaries.
We consider a multi-channel system where the secondary nodes can potentially use
a subset of the K channels. Each channel has a bandwidth of b. Note that, the achievable
capacity (i.e., bit rate) on a channel depends on the SINR the receiver is exposed to on
that channel. Hence, the channels are non-substitutable. We assume that a source node has
a bandwidth requirement of breq . Thus, the source node must seek a path that is able to
support this target bit rate. While there might exist multiple paths that can cater to the
bit rate requirement, we find the one that minimizes the total payment to the intermediate
nodes.
For the purpose of routing, each intermediate node plays the role of both a seller and
a buyer. If we consider any single hop in a route, the transmitter is the buyer which wants to
buy channels from a potential receiver which is the seller. Since there could be multiple next
hop receivers for a transmitter, the transmitter decides to buy the channel from the seller
which has the minimum bid and is also able to sustain the bandwidth requirement. The
winning seller (receiver) becomes the buyer (transmitter) for the next hop, and the process
continues till the destination node becomes the final receiver.
A buyer sorts the bids in an ascending order and disregards any bid that is higher
than the reserve price. Then, it chooses the one with the minimum bid. The reserve price is
the maximum price that a buyer is willing to pay. Using such a reserve price eliminates the
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number of competitors which would not win anyway. Of course, the choice of the reserve
price is critical– a low reserve price might lead to elimination of all competitors, whereas, a
high reserve price might lead to too many sellers to deal with.
Note, when a seller computes the bid, it takes into consideration the bit rate requirement. A seller not able to satisfy the bit rate requirements on any of the channels will simply
not make a bid. Thus, a bid is always valid in terms of supporting a specific bit rate.

4.2.1

Bid Computation by Seller

The objective of the bidder is to sell a bundle (i.e., a set) of channels that satisfies the bit rate
requirement. Since there could be numerous such bundles, the seller must offer the bundle
for which the cost will be minimum. The buyer gets multiple offers from multiple sellers and
chooses the seller who offers the minimum price for its bundle. As for the buyer, it does
not matter what the composition of the bundle is i.e., whether the bundle is composed of 1
channel or multiple channels. All it knows for sure is that the offered bundle will satisfy the
bit rate requirement.
Each seller calculates its bid based on three parameters: i) signal to interference and
noise ratio on a specific channel, ii) achievable capacity on each channel, and iii) the required
bandwidth or the number of channels needed to satisfy the buyer’s bit rate requirement.
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4.2.1.1

SINR on each channel

As we know for a given bandwidth, the maximum capacity achievable depends on the SINR.
As a result, the seller must determine the SINR on each channel, before estimating the
achievable capacity on each channel. Note, each receiver is exposed to different levels of
noise and interference on every channel based on their distances from various transmitters.
For example, receiver i is interfered on channel 1 only by the transmitters which use channel
1. Similarly, receiver i will be interfered on channels 2 and so on.
As a result, interference perceived at node i on channel j from all its neighboring
nodes can be calculated as:

Ii,j =

X Pn
dαi,n
n∈N

(4.9)

i

where n ∈ Ni are the neighbors of node i using channel j. Pn is the transmit power from
neighbor n, di,n is the distance between nodes i and n, and α is the path loss exponent.
The SINR for node i on channel j and for transmitter t is :

t
SIN Ri,j

=

Pt
dα
i,t

n0 + Ii,j

(4.10)

where Pt is the transmit power of the transmitter, di,t is the distance between node i and
transmitter t, and n0 is the background noise.
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4.2.1.2

Capacity on each channel

The seller can use the Shannon’s theory to calculate the capacity on each channel between
itself and transmitter t. The capacity on channel j for seller i for transmitter t given as

t
)
cti,j = b × log(1 + SIN Ri,j

where b is the bandwidth of each channel. The capacity on all K channels can be written as
in the form of a vector:
Cit = [cti,1 , cti,2 , · · · , cti,K ]

4.2.1.3

Channel bundle

With the capacities on every channel known, the seller can offer to sell the channels for a
price. Let us consider two cases: i) when the seller can sell only one channel and ii) when the
seller can sell multiple channels. For case ii), we can have two sub-cases based on whether
the prices for every channel is the same or different.

Case i) Seller sells only one channel
The buyer buys one channel that satisfies the bit rate requirement of bt . The seller identifies
the channels that can meet the requirement. It is possible that none of the channels meet
the requirement. In that case, there is no route through node i. Among the valid channels,
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the seller picks the one with the minimum price. This is the bidding price by seller i.

Case ii) Seller sells multiple channels
When this scenario, we consider two sub-cases where all the channels have the same price
and when the channels have varying prices.

1. All channels have fixed price:
For every seller, we arrange the expected capacity of each channel in a descending
manner. Given the bit rate requirement of the buyer (bt ), we check how many channels
would be required. If the best channel (with respect to the capacity obtained) can
sustain bt , then just that channel would suffice. Else, we check if the best two would
suffice. If not, we consider the best three and so on. If we assume best k channels are
required to meet the demand of bt , then the offered price is Kpi , where pi is the price
of each channel by seller i.
2. All channels have varying prices:
Since the price for every channel by seller i is different, we have to check for all possibilities of channel bundles that could satisfy the bit rate. Among all valid bundles,
seller i picks the one that has the least cost i.e., the sum of cost of all the channels
in that bundle is minimum. In order to find the least-cost bundle, all combinatorial
possibilities need to be explored, which we discuss next.
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4.2.2

Combinatorial Auctions

Advantages of the exploring all combinatorial possibilities for the auction bid include higher
efficiency, better fairness, and lower transaction costs. On the other hand, combinatorial auctions are considered NP-hard because the auctioneer has to calculate the result of the winner
determination problem (WDP) to solve the revenue-maximization or cost-minimization in
the auction.
The upper bound of computing for single item auctions is O(|N ||M |), where N is
the number of items and M is the number of buyers or sellers. This is because, finding
the minimum or maximum is a simple task of searching for the lowest/highest bids. In
combinatorial auctions, the auctioneer must test all bid combinations with the intention of
finding the optimal bid.
The number of feasible combinations is:


M 
X
M
q=1

where

M
q



q

= 2M − 1

(4.11)

is the number of feasible combinations with q item with m being the total number

of items. The complexity of combinatorial actions is between o(M M/2 ) and O(M M ) [66].
There are usually three broad approaches to solve the WDP depending on how good
the solution quality would be and what the allowed computation time is. These are: i)
deterministic methods where the optimal solution is found by searching (enumerating) the
entire search space explicitly or implicitly, ii) heuristic methods where the aim is to find a
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trade-off between the solution quality and the calculation effort; thus, global optimal are not
guaranteed, and iii) equilibrium methods where bidders are allowed to bid simultaneously
on bundles of items in multiple rounds which reduces the algorithmic and communication
complexity of the auction by using temporal price and other information from the equilibrium
process. First, we mention the exhaustive scheme where all possible routes are considered.
Though theoretically they provide the most optimized route, they are practically infeasible
due to their intractability. Then, we discuss the proposed heuristic which uses the few lowest
unit cost of the bandwidth provided by each channel. Our argument of using the unit cost
is based on that fact that unit costs are good indications of total costs.

4.2.2.1

Exhaustive scheme

Here, the idea is to search in all possible routes from the source to the destination with all
possible bid options considered at each hop. The route with overall minimum payment is
chosen as the optimal one. For the single channel case, only the channels that satisfy the bit
rate requirement are considered and the least cost one is the only channel to be considered
at each hop between a transmitter and potential receivers. This reduces the complexity;
however, for the multi-channel case, none of the channels can be ignored as all channels can
potentially be a part of the least-cost bundle.
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4.2.2.2

O(nlogn) Heuristic

In order to reduce the computational time and the complexity, we propose to consider the
unit price for the achievable capacity on every channel being sold by the receiver. The
channels are sorted in an ascending order with respect to their unit price. Starting with the
least-cost (unit price wise) channel, we consider one additional channel at a time and check
if the channels considered so far meet the bit rate requirement. If not, we consider the next
channel and so on.

An Illustrative Example: Let us consider an example where seller i has 8 channels to sell
as shown in Table 4.1. Though all the channels have the same bandwidth, the capacities are
different because the SINR varies on different channel as was discussed in section 4.2.1.2.
The total price of the capacity on each channel is also shown. We get the unit price by
dividing the total price by the capacity.
Table 4.1 An illustrative example
Channel
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Capacity (Mbps) 4.9 1.0 2.3 5.1 3.8 2.0 5.5 6.2
Total price
10
2
3
11
7
4 11 12
Unit price
2.04 2 1.30 2.16 1.84 2
2 1.93

Now suppose, a required capacity by a buyer is 5 Mbps. Each of the channels 4, 7, and
8 satisfy this requirement. Thus, if only one channel is considered then the minimum cost is
11. However, if we bundle channels 2, 3, and 6, we see that they satisfy the requirement with
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the minimum cost of 9. Of course, finding such bundle requires us to consider all possible
bundles that satisfy the requirement of 5 Mbps.
Table 4.2 Sorted with unit price
Channel
3
5
8
2
6
7
1
4
Capacity (Mbps) 2.3 3.8 6.2 1.0 2.0 5.5 4.9 5.1
Total rice
3
7
12
2
4 11 10
11
Unit price
1.30 1.84 1.93 2
2
2 2.04 2.15

For a quicker solution, we sort the channels based on the unit prices in an ascending
order. Any sorting algorithm, such as the merge sort with time complexity O(nlogn), can be
used. The result is shown in Table 4.2. The idea is to start with the least unit price channel
and check if it satisfies the bit-rate requirement of 5 Mbps. Here, channel 3 does not. Then
the least two unit price channels are considered i.e., channels 3 and 5. These two provide a
total capacity of 2.3 + 3.8 = 6.1 Mbps which is more than 5 Mbps. Thus, the channel bundle
is found which has a cost of 3 + 7 = 10. Note that, this heuristic need not guarantee the
lowest possible price for the bundle.

4.2.2.3

The Routing Algorithm

So far, we presented how the next hop will be determined based on the least cost channel
bundle where the seller’s role is to submit its bid in a sealed-bid form, reflecting its ability
and willingness to forward. The buyer’s role is to execute a local sealed bid auction to
determine the winner of the auction. The winner is the bidder with the lowest bid. We
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assume that the bidder reveals the true price and does not know about other bidders’ price.
This per hop phenomenon is repeated at each forwarding node. A seller in a particular
hop becomes the buyer in the next till the destination is reached. The total price of each
route is accumulated through the repeated bidding process over all the hops. The route with
minimum payment is chosen as an optimal solution. The proposed auction based algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3 Routing Algorithm
Require: G=(V; E); Source s; destination d randomly among all nodes
1: T otalP rice ← 0, Steps ← 1, BiddingF lag←0, N umberV alidP aths←0, Average(s)←0
2:
3:
4:
5:

6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:

26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
34:

while true do
Sequence[step] ← Current Node
Get Neighbors of the Current Node
Check
1. Received multiple copies of same request? Cycle?
2. Disconnected node?
if 1,2 then
break the routing and choose another s and d
end if
if d is a child of Current Node then
N umberV alidP aths=N umberV alidP aths +1
Calculate the overall bidding/payment
Calculate the Average for all variables
Check, is it the optimal path?
end if
for all Neighbors j ∈ Ni do
OriginalSource ← SourceN ode.ID
N extN odeID←CurrN eighbors[N extGeneration]
Currbid ← bid from CurrN eighbors to OriginalSource[N extGeneration]
1.
caculate SINR for each channel, based on the transmitter
2.
calculate achievable capacity for each channel, based on the transmitter
3.
if Case 1 then
20:
Seller bids for the channel that satisfies the bit rate requirement and has
the minimum price
4.
else {Case 2}
22:
calculate unit price for each channel
23:
sort channels by mergesort
24:
search for channel(s) satisfies the bit rate
5.
end if
if Is there a bidding value? BiddingF lag ==1 then
T otalP rice = T otalP rice + Currbid
N extN ode = CurrN ode
Sequence[Steps] = N extN ode → ID
Steps = Steps + 1
Routing(N extN ode, DestinationN ode)
end if
end for
end while
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CHAPTER 5: OPPORTUNISTIC SCHEDULING IN DSA
NETWORKS

In case of multiple secondary users who try to operate on the same channel(s), it is the
responsibility of the MAC protocol to manage the policy for them to access. However,
multiple secondary users can use the same channel simultaneously, as long as they do not
interfere with each other. Such constraints are usually represented by a conflict graph, where
the nodes represent the SUs and an edge represents interference between the nodes that share
the edge. In this chapter we present opportunistic scheduling algorithms for DSA networks.
The first part of this chapter discusses algorithms that schedule one channel among multiple
SUs. The second part discusses a multi-channel scheduling algorithm.

5.1

Single Channel Opportunistic Scheduling

We consider a dynamic spectrum access network with multiple secondary users randomly
scattered over an area, and one primary user. The primary user owns a spectrum band which
represents a channel. Secondary users contend for that channel to transfer their packets and
perform other functions.
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We consider a time-slotted system where a super-frame is a repetitive structure and
is composed of k slots. We assume all the users to be synchronized. At the beginning of each
super-frame, all users sense the channel to determine the status of the primary user. If the
channel is idle, the slots in that superframe are allocated to the uses. The sensing process
also allows the users to determine their signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) which
we use as a metric to determine the goodness of a channel. Of course, SINR varies from one
user to another due to spatial and temporal reasons. We represent SIN Ri,j as the SINR for
user i channel j.
In order to maximize throughput and to increase overall spectrum efficiency, multiple
SUs can be assigned to the same time slot. At the same time, in order to insure collision free
communication, all the nodes in the neighborhood of the allocated node i should be silent or
must transmit on a different time slot. We tackle this situation by finding the independent
sets (IS) of the SU s based on the interference graph, which is then used by the scheduling
algorithm to allocate the slots.

5.1.1

Scheduling using Independent Sets

With the randomly deployed network, each node will experience varying levels of SINR
on the channel when vacant by the primary, as mentioned before. The objective of the
proposed scheduling scheme is to allocate time slots to those nodes that experience high
SINR– implying better throughput. However, the channel can not be allocated to nodes that
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are interfering even if they have high SINR. As a result, we identify sets of non-interfering
nodes and allow them to transmit on the same time slot. This problem of identifying such
sets is similar to the problem of finding independent sets for the given network which is
NP-complete [67].
An independent set contains all SUs such that they do not interfere with each other.
SUs interfere with each other if they use the same channel and are within the transmission
range of each other. Thus, we use an interference graph that gives the conflict of every
SU. In the graph, an edge between nodes i and j means that they are close to each other
and therefore can not use the same channel at the same time. However, the channel can
be simultaneously used by nodes that belong to different independent sets since they do
not interfere with each other. Such simultaneous re-use of channel increases the spatial
utilization of the spectrum bands.

5.1.1.1

Finding Independent Sets

As mentioned before we try to maximize the throughput and also address the fairness issue.
As a result, we propose two algorithms to find the independent sets for each goal.

Algorithm 1: Maximizing the Throughput
We start with the entire network represented by graph G. We find the receiving node that
can achieve the highest SINR given its corresponding transmitter. We call that node n1
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and place it in the first independent set, represented by IS1 . All neighbors of n1 in the
interference conflict graph cannot be placed IS1 . Therefore, we remove all such nodes and
their edges from G to obtained G0 . Note that, no node in G0 interferes with IS1 . We follow
the same process of finding the node with the highest SINR in G0 (say n2 ) and place it in
n1 . We further reduce G0 and continue to find nodes that would belong to IS1 till the graph
reduces to a null set. All the nodes placed thus are non-interfering with each other and can
transmit on same slot. This set of nodes belong to independent set IS1 .
With the set of nodes placed in IS1 , we proceed to find the next independent set from
nodes that are in G − IS1 . We follow the same process and obtain the second independent
set, IS2 . Then we consider the remaining nodes in G − IS1 − IS2 and continue in the same
manner till all nodes belong to some independent set.
An Illustrative Example: Consider the network of 11 nodes as shown in Fig. 5.1. Suppose
the SINR of the nodes labelled from A to K are sorted from the highest to the lowest– rank
1 is for the highest SINR and so on. Fig. 5.1, Fig. 5.2, and Fig. 5.3 show the steps of finding
the independent sets for algorithm 1. Thus, the nodes in network G can be partitioned into
3 independent sets with 7, 2, and 2 nodes in each respectively.
Algorithm 2: Maximizing the Fairness
Though Algorithm 1 maximizes the throughput, it does not guarantee that all nodes are
allocated an equal share of the time slots. Some will get more time slots than others. In order
to be fair with respect to the number of slots allocated, we use the history of the allocation
for making future scheduling decisions. Each node maintains a counter that contains the
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Figure 5.1 Network: G; IS1 = [E, F, D, K, G, A, H]
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K

number of time slots already allocated to it so far. Generally, we use the same technique as
in Algorithm 1 to create the independent sets, but this time we start with the node that has
the lowest number of allocated time slots allocated so far and place it in IS1 and remove its
neighbors and their edges from the network G to form G0 . Then, we follow the same process
of finding the node with the second lowest number of allocated time slots in G0 and place it
to IS1 and so on till the network reduces to a null set. We follow the same process to create
the second independent set, IS2 , and continue in the same manner till all nodes belong to
some independent set.
An Illustrative Example: Again, we use the same network of 11 nodes as shown in
Fig. 5.4. Nodes are labelled from A to K and the adjoining numbers represent the number
of slots already allocated to each node till the current super-frame. Fig. 5.4, Fig. 5.5, Fig. 5.6,
and Fig. 5.7 show the steps of finding the independent sets for algorithm 2. Thus, the nodes
in network G can be partitioned into 4 independent sets with 5, 3, 2, and 1 nodes in each
respectively.
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Figure 5.4 Network: G; IS1 = [B, G, H, D, K]

75

K

0

1

D

C

B

A

F

E

2

1
G
0

3
1
2

2

1
H

I

2
J

K

C

D

Figure 5.5 Network: G’=G-IS1 ; IS2 = [A, C, I]
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Figure 5.6 Network: G”=G-IS1 -IS2 ; IS3 = [F, E]
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Figure 5.7 Network: G”’=G-IS1 -IS2 -IS3 ; IS4 = [J]
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5.1.1.2

Allocation Process

For a randomly distributed network, it is likely that that the first independent set will have
the maximum number of nodes followed by the second independent set and so on. Though
there could be cases where this observation does not hold true, we still use this argument as
is true in most cases for a Poisson distributed network.
We assign the first time slot of the super-frame to IS1 , the second time slot to IS2 and
so on. Two cases might arise. The number of time slots in a super-frame, (s), could be equal
to or more than the number of independent sets, say k. In that case, all the independent sets
can be assigned a time slot. If on the other hand, the number of time slots in a super-frame
is less than the number of independent set, then not all sets can be assigned time slots, and
thus, we will have to somehow select the ones that will be assigned.
Case 1: When k ≤ s
When k = s, each independent set is uniquely assigned one slot within a super-frame. When
k < s, some of the independent sets can be assigned more than one time slots in a superframe. In order to identify which independent sets should be allocated more than once, we
use the sets that have the highest SINR. Once the k independent sets are assigned to k time
slots, there are s − k time slots that remain. We start with IS1 and then IS2 and continue
in that fashion till all the remaining slots are assigned. If needed, the process of allocating
the additional slots has to be repeated for more than once. At the end of the allocation,
none of the time slots will remain unassigned.
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For Algorithm 2, we follow the same process but start with the independent set that
has the most number of un-allocated nodes.
Case 2: When k > s
When k > s, some of the independent sets will not get a time slot within the current
super-frame.
Using a counter, we keep track of the number of slots allocated to all users irrespective
of the independent set they belong to. This counter is used to create the independent sets
for Algorithm 2 which ensures fairness between users.
In case there is a tie between two independent sets such as the total number of
allocated time slots in the ISi is equal to the total number of allocated time slots in the
ISj , the set with more number of nodes is allocated. Fig. 5.8 shows an example of the two
previous cases.

IS1

Figure 5.8 Allocation Process: Top figure shows, IS1 and IS2 get two slots in the super-frame.
Bottom figure shows, IS7 and IS8 do not get any time slot.
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5.1.2

Metrics

In order to measure the performance of the proposed scheduling algorithm 1 and algorithm 2
in single channel environment, we use three metrics: throughput, number of slots allocated,
and fairness among users.
Throughput
Let us consider a system with n users. The MAC super-frame has s slots, s > 0, and consider
T such super-frames where T is a large number.
We define and study the throughput in three different ways:
Definition 1: Average throughput of user i per slot denoted by ti is defined as:
T X
s
X
ti,j,k
ti =
s×T
k=1 j=1

(5.1)

where, ti,j,k is the throughput of user i on slot j at super-frame k.
Definition 2: Average throughput per slot due to all users denoted by Sslot is given
as:
Sslot =

n X
T X
s
n
X
X
ti,j,k
=
ti
s
×
T
i=1 k=1 j=1
i=1

(5.2)

Definition 3: Average throughput per slot /per user is denoted by Sslot/user is given
as:
Pn
Sslot/user =

i=1 ti

n
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=

Sslot
n

(5.3)

Number of Slots Allocated
Let us denote the total number of slots allocated to user i as ci for T super-frames. Obviously,
the total number of slots is s × T .
The fraction of slots allocated to user i denoted by fi is given as:

fi =

ci
s×T

(5.4)

The average fraction of slots allocated to all users denoted by f¯ is given by:

f¯ =

Pi=n

ci
i=1 s×T

n

Pi=n
=

i=1

fi

n

(5.5)

Fairness among users
In order to determine whether the secondary users are receiving a fair share of the spectrum
band, we resort to the popularly used Jain’s fairness index. Recall, the total number of slots
allocated to user i is ci .
Jain’s fairness index is defined as:

P
( ni=1 ci )2
J (c1 , c2 , · · · , cn ) = Pn 2
n i=1 ci

The index varies from

1
n

(worst case) to 1 (best case).

80

(5.6)

5.1.2.1

Optimal Size of Super-frame

So far, we use s as a variable denoting the number of slots in each super-frame. Having a small
s does not allow the opportunity for all users to be allocated; however, higher throughput
is obtained per slot on the average. On the other hand, a large s allows the opportunity for
more users to be allocated; however, a lower throughput is obtained per slot on the average.
Thus, we seek to find an optimal value of s that would strike a balance between the average
number of users assigned in each super-frame and average number of users assigned in each
slot.
We define nj,k as the number of users assigned on slot j of super-frame k. Thus, the
average number of users assigned in each super-frame denoted by nsf is given by:

nsf

s
T
1 XX
nj,k
=
T k=1 j=1

(5.7)

The average number of users assigned in each slot denoted by nslot is given by:

nslot

T
s
1 XX
nsf
=
nj,k =
s × T k=1 j=1
s

(5.8)

It can be noted that nsf is an increasing function and nslot is a decreasing function
as s increases. We take the linear combination of the two to get

n = α × nsf + (1 − α) × nslot
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(5.9)

where α is a weighing factor.

5.2

Multi-channel Opportunistic Scheduling

Now, we consider a dynamic spectrum access network with multiple secondary and multiple
primary users. There are U primary users and each owns an unique channel– thus, there
are U channels. Secondary users rely on the primaries’ channel(s) for their communication
needs. We consider a time-slotted system where a super-frame is composed of N slots.
We assume all the secondary users are synchronized through some beacon signaling over
some common control channel. Though this widely used assumption is open to criticism,
nevertheless we make use of a out-of-band signaling for secondary users’ synchronization.
At the beginning of each super-frame, all secondary users sense the channels to determine
the status of the primary channel occupancy. If any primary channel is idle, that channel
can potentially be used by the SUs in that super-frame. The sensing process also allows the
secondary transmitter-receiver pairs to determine their SINR on each channel which we use
as a metric to determine the goodness of each channel. Due to the spatial and temporal
reasons, the SINR varies from user to user and also from channel to channel.
Let PU u use channel u. SINR at SU v on channel u is denoted as SIN Rv,u . Note,
the interference on channel u is from the PU and the SUs using channel u (as in (3.5)).
SUs may or may not have packets to transmit. Backlogged packets reside in their queues.
Irrespective of the packet handling process, packet arrivals are independent for each user and
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follow batch Bernoulli process (BBP) with rate of λ packets per unit time. Packet lengths
are exponentially distributed with mean l bits.
We consider a cellular-type network with a centralized scheduler which has the ability
to compute or learn the SU locations; thus it can compute the interference graph. Each SU
v reports SIN Rv,u and its current queue length to the scheduler. Knowledge of SIN Rv,u
enables the scheduler to calculate the expected throughput of SU v on channel u.
Though the channel with the highest SINR is supposed to be the best channel for
user v, allocating the best channel to user v need not maximize the throughput if user v
does not have enough packets in the transmission queue. Thus, apart from SIN Rv,u , the
current queue size must also be taken into consideration. For example, it might be better to
assign a channel to a user who can make better use of the channel, i.e., have enough packets
waiting to be transmitted.
The objective of the scheduler is to schedule on frame-by-frame basis, i.e., assign slots
in a frame to SUs that maximize the throughput while avoiding any conflict. It may be noted
that the PU channel, SINR, and queue status can change in every slot – thus making the
decision at the beginning of a frame non-optimal. Therefore, it is important to consider how
and with what probability these parameters change. Such considerations do not guarantee
optimal solutions, nevertheless, the solutions would be close to optimal, i.e., the solution we
would have gotten if we considered slot-by-slot scheduling.
To capture the conflicts (interference) among the SUs, i.e., when they are within each
other’s transmission range, we use an interference graph, where an edge between nodes v
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and u indicates they are close-by and hence cannot simultaneously use the same channel.
However, the channel can be simultaneously used by nodes that are non-conflicting. Such
re-use of channel increases the spatial utilization of the spectrum bands.

5.2.1

Primary Channel Occupancy

We assume that the channel occupancy by primary users follows a two-state Markov process,
and the process is identical and independent for each channel. The channel status could be
0 or 1 depending on the primary activity, where 0 means‘idle’ and 1 means ‘busy’. The
channel status in slot n is denoted by Cn . Similar channel occupancy model was used in [50]
and [49]. The state transition matrix P (Cn+1 | Cn ) is defined as:





P (0 | 0) P (1 | 0)

P (Cn+1 | Cn ) = 


P (0 | 1) P (1 | 1)
where P (í | i) represents the transition probability from state i in the current slot to í
in the next slot. We consider two states, (i, í ∈ {0, 1}). Also, with U channels from the
same number of PUs, we denote the state transition matrix conforming to channel u where
u
u ∈ {1, · · · , U } as P (Cn+1
| Cnu ). As mentioned before, we assume that all secondary users

sense the channels at the beginning of the each super-frame to determine the status. As a
result, the transitions probabilities are known to the SUs.
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5.2.2

SINR Levels

The calculation methods of SIN Ri,j is mentioned in subsection 3.2.1. To avoid any ambiguity, starting from this section till the end of multi channel scheduling, we calculate the
interference the interference between SU v and PU u on channel u is calculated as [68, 50]:
Though SIN Rv,u ∈ (SIN Rmin , SIN Rmax ), where SIN Rmin and SIN Rmax are the
minimum and maximum SINR values respectively, we quantize SIN Rv,u as:

SIN Rv,u ∈ {S0 , S1 , S2 , · · · , SS−1 }

(5.10)

where S is the number of quantization levels. With a little abuse of notation for ease of
presentation, we write (5.10) as:

SIN Rv,u ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , S − 1}

(5.11)

We model the channel quality as a Markov process with S states. The state transition
u,v
matrix is given by P (su,v
n+1 | sn ) for every channel u associated with user v. The probability

that the channel state changes from quality j in slot n to quality j́ in slot n + 1 is p(su,v
n+1 =
j́ | su,v
n = j), where j and j́ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , S − 1}.
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5.2.3

SU Queues

A common assumption in the literature is that all SUs have back-logged traffic i.e., they
have sufficient number of packets waiting in the output queue to be transmitted. This need
not be true in all cases where some of the SUs might be lightly loaded and might even have
empty queues at certain times. Thus, it becomes necessary to check if a SU has enough
packets in the output queue to fill a slot, or at-least most of it. For example, it does not
make sense to allocate a channel to a SU who does not have any packets to transmit even if
the SU has favorable channel conditions.
We assume that packet arrivals follow the batch Bernoulli process (BBP) where up
to P packets might arrive in a slot. We represent the process as: α = [α0 , α1 , · · · , αP ], where
αi is the probability that i packets arrive in a slot. One may think of a BBP as a type of a
superposition of independent and identically distributed Bernoulli process [69].
The average arrival rate, λ, can be calculated as: λ =

PP

i=0

i × αi The number of

packets in the queue are identically and independently distributed. For any user, the packets
are served in a first come first serve manner.

5.2.4

Scheduling using Non-Interfering Sets

Based on the PU channel status, SINR, and SU queue, we propose a scheduling technique
that maximizes the expected throughput. We also consider the interference conflict graph
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to identify the SUs who can be assigned the same set of channels to maximize the channel
re-use spatially as well as temporally.

5.2.4.1

Expected Throughput

We calculate the expected throughput of each user on each channel for each slot as Tn (u, v)
where v is the user, u is the channel and n is the slot. Motivated by [46], we present a state
u,v
u
vector Xnu,v = [su,v
n , qn ] for n = 1, · · · , N , where sn is the channel quality (i.e., SINR) for

channel u for the user v in slot n, and qnu is the queue status of user v at the beginning of slot
n. We assume that the status of a channel u in slot n is idle, that means cun = 0 and there
is no PU activity and any SU can use channel u in slot n. For simplicity, Xnu,v is written as
Xn . The probability distribution for the state vector Xn in slot n is denoted as:

Πn = [Π(sn =i,qn =k) ]

(5.12)

where i ∈ {0, · · · , S − 1} and k ∈ {0, · · · , Q}, where Q is the maximum queue length. It
represents the probability that the values of the states sn and qn are i and k, respectively.
The transitions among the states occur at the slot boundaries with probability P (xn+1 |
xn ), also written as P (sn+1 = í, qn+1 = ḱ | sn = i, qn = k), where í ∈ {0, · · · , S − 1}, and
ḱ ∈ {0, · · · , Q}. All previous states variables are discrete values and modeled with Markov
chain as above.
87

As a result, we can model the evaluation of the state vector xn using a discrete-time
Markov process with the state transition matrix as: P (Xn+1 | Xn ) =
P (0,0|0,0)
P (0,0|0,1)

P (0,1|0,0)
P (0,1|0,1)

···
···

P (S−1,Q|0,0)
P (S−1,Q|0,1)

..
.

..
.

..

..
.

.

!

P (0,0|S−1,Q) P (0,1|S−1,Q) ··· P (S−1,Q|S−1,Q)

The transition probability is written as:

P (í, ḱ | i, k) = P (sn+1 = í, qn+1 = ḱ | sn = i, qn = k)
=

P (sn+1 = í, qn+1 = ḱ, sn = i, qn = k)
P (sn = i, qn = k)

P (qn+1 = ḱ | sn = i, qn = k, sn+1 = í)
× P (sn = i, qn = k, sn + 1 = í)
=
P (sn = i, qn = k)

(5.13)

= P (qn+1 = ḱ | sn = i, qn = k, sn+1 = í) × P (sn+1 = í | sn = i, qn = k)

We can reformulate eqn. (5.13) as:

P (í, ḱ | i, k) = P (qn+1 = ḱ | sn = i, qn = k) × P (sn+1 = í | sn = i)

(5.14)

since the states variables of sn+1 and qn+1 are independent from one another. This is because
the queue length also depends on the arrival process which is no way related to the channel
quality that governs the packet departure process.
The value of P (sn+1 = í | sn = i) is calculated as discussed in section 4.2.1.2, while
the value of P (qn+1 = ḱ | sn = i, qn = k) is calculated based on the queue status, qn+1 , which
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depends on i) qn , ii) the number of arriving packets at the queue, an , in slot n, and iii) the
number of packets departing, dn , in slot n. Thus, we get:

qn+1 = qn − dn + an

(5.15)

Though a good SINR would allow many packets to be transmitted from the queue,
but an SU might not have that many packets. Thus, the number of packets that can be
transmitted is limited by the channel capacity or the current queue length. If tn denotes
that maximum number of packets that can be potentially transmitted as per Shannon’s law,
then the number of packets departing in slot n is given as:

dn = min(qn , tn )

(5.16)

The expected throughput Tn (u, v) on any channel u and SU v in slot n is calculated
from equations (5.12) and (5.16) as:

Tn =

X

Π(sn =i,qn =k) dn

(5.17)

i,k

For each channel u, the expected throughput Tn (u, v) for all SUs M in all slots N can be
written in one M × N matrix. Similarly, for each SU, the expected throughput Tn (u, v) on
all channels U in all slots N is written in one U × N matrix.
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5.2.4.2

Finding Non-Interfering Sets

With randomly deployed nodes, each SU experiences varying SINR on vacant PU channels.
The aim of the proposed scheduling is to allocate time slots to the SUs which experience
high SINR and have sufficient queued packets to transmit.
For allocating channels to the SUs that offers the best throughput, we recall that the
same channel cannot be allocated to users that are within the interfering range of each other.
However, multiple non-interfering users can simultaneously transmit on the same channel.
Therefore, we identify sets of non-interfering users which we call Non-Interfering Sets (NIS).
The problem of finding such non-interfering sets in an arbitrary network is known to be
NP-complete.
In addition to grouping the non-conflicting users, we try group them in a set such
away that they would also maximize the system throughput. Thus, we propose an algorithm
to find the NISs that also maximize the throughput.

Algorithm: As mentioned before, we have an expected throughput matrix for each channel
for each user for each slot. We start with the entire network represented by G. We find the
user (represented by ‘node’ in a graph) that can achieve the highest expected throughput
for first slot. We call that node n1 and place it in the first non-interfering set, represented
by N IS1 . All neighbors of n1 in the interference conflict graph cannot be placed N IS1 .
Therefore, we remove all such nodes and their edges from G to obtained G0 .
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Suppose, the throughput of n1 was maximized for some channel, say c1 . We follow
the same process of finding the node with the highest expected throughput for first slot for
the same channel (c1 ) in G0 (say n2 ) and place it in N IS1 . Note that, no node in G0 interferes
with N IS1 . We further reduce the G0 and continue to find nodes that would be belong to
N IS1 till the graph reduces to a null set. Thus, all the nodes belonging to non-interfering
set N IS1 do not interfere with each other and can transmit on channel c1 in first slot.
With channel c1 allocated to N IS1 , we find the second non-interfering set from the
remaining channels U − c1 , where U is the total channel set. We find the channel from U − c1
that offers the maximum throughput. Suppose, that channel is c2 . We continue as before to
find N IS2 which is allocated c2 .
Note, it may happen that N IS1 and N IS2 can have some or all of the nodes common.
However, since the two sets use different channels, having common node(s) between the two
non-interfering sets is allowable. Continuing similarly, we get U non-interfering sets – each
having a unique channel. Note that, some nodes may not belong to any non-interfering set.

An Illustrative Example:
Let us consider a network with 6 nodes labeled A through F and 3 channels, as shown
in Fig. 5.9. The expected throughput on each channel in a slot is shown next to a node. For
example, C has the expected throughput on channels 1, 2, and 3 respectively 17, 24, and 13.
Using the proposed algorithm, we form the non-interfering sets. With 3 channels,
the non-interfering sets formed are: {B, D}, {B, E}, and {A, C}. It may be noted that, B
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{17,24,13}

{19,26,15}
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D
{15,24,12}

{18,18,18}
{16,20,11}

{18,15,15}

F

E

Figure 5.9 Finding the Non-interfering Sets. N IS1 = (B, D) uses channel c1 ; N IS2 = (B, E)
uses channel c2 ; N IS3 = (A, C) uses channel c3 . B belongs to two NISs while F belongs to
none.
belongs to two non-interfering sets, whereas F does not belong to any. Though F is not
allocated any channel during this slot, it may be assigned channel(s) in the other slots in
the super-frame.

5.2.4.3

Allocation Process

Channels are allocated to the nodes on slot-by-slot basis. The number of available channels
are allocated to the equal number of non-interfering sets. In the first slot, N IS1 is allocated
channel c1 that maximizes its throughput. Then, channel c2 is allocated to the N IS2 , and
so on, until all channels are allocated to all the non-interfering sets. The same process is
repeated for all slots in a super-frame. As a result, a node may be assigned more than one
channel in the same slot. Also, multiple nodes are allocated the same channel. Thus, the
process increases the overall throughput.
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5.2.5

Metrics

In order to measure the performance of the proposed algorithm for scheduling in multichannel environment , we use five metrics: throughput, number of slots allocated, fairness
among users, delay, and blocking probability.
Throughput
The system is considered to have M users and U channels. We consider a large period
of time consisting of T super-frames (each consisting of N slots) and quantify throughput
during this time. Obviously, the total number of slots is N × T . Setting T → ∞ gives the
steady state average.
We define and study the throughput in three different ways.

Definition 1: Average throughput of user v per slot for all channels is denoted by tv
is defined as:
tv =

T X
N X
U
X
tv,u,k,l
n×T
l=1 k=1 u=1

(5.18)

where, tv,u,k,l is the throughput of user v on channel u in slot k of super-frame l.

Definition 2: Average throughput per slot due to all users and all channels denoted
by Sslot is given as:
Sslot

M X
T X
N X
U
m
X
X
tv,u,k,l
=
=
tv
N ×T
v=1 l=1 k=1 u=1
v=1
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(5.19)

Definition 3: Average throughput per slot/per user is denoted denoted by Sslot/user
is given as:

Pm
Sslot/user =

v=1 tv

M

=

Sslot
M

(5.20)

Number of Slots Allocated
Denote the total number of slots allocated to user v for all channels as cv for T super-frames.
The fraction of slots allocated to user v is given as:

fv =

cv
N ×T

(5.21)

The average fraction of slots allocated to all users is:

v=M
1 X
f¯ =
fv
M v=1

(5.22)

Fairness among users
Just like section 5.1.2, we also use JFI for this algorithm.
Delay
The overall system delay is obtained by absorbing the Markov chain. Packets arrive
at the queues of all SUs with an arrival rate of λ packets per unit time. The queue length
varies based on the number of packets that arrive and the number of packets that depart
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the queue. The delay incurred by a packet is the difference between the time when it enters
and leaves the queue. We denote Dp,v as the delay for packet p for user v. Average system
delay is obtained as:
PM P
Avg. System Delay =

v=1

all p

Np

Dp,v

(5.23)

where Np is the total number of packets sent from all users.

Blocking probability
It is defined as the probability of a user not getting a slot for transmission. In other
words, the blocked users are the ones who do not belong to any non-interfering set. We find
the long term fraction of those users.
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CHAPTER 6: SIMULATION MODEL AND RESULTS

In this chapter, we discuss the simulation models, experiments and corresponding results
of our work. In order to evaluate the performance of proposed mechanisms, we conducted
extensive simulation experiments in C++ and MATLAB on UNIX and Windows based
platforms. Our intention was to generate and test situations that represent the real world
scenarios as closely as possible.
Our simulation study is broadly divided into six parts. In section 6.1 and in section ??,
we discuss the results of auction-based channels allocation. In section 6.3, we present the
results of the proposed pricing-based routing mechanism. In section 6.4, we show the results
of using auction theory for routing. The results for opportunistic scheduling techniques are
discussed in sections 6.5 and 6.6.
Unless otherwise stated, we considered N nodes randomly scattered over a 100 × 100
square grid. All nodes are assumed to have the same transmission range. By using different
values of the transmission range, we could get different topologies– from sparsely connected
to densely connected.
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6.1

Single Auction-Based Channel Allocation

We consider up to 200 nodes which were randomly scattered over the network. We fixed
the number of primaries to 8. The transmit power of a primary PU was 3.010 dBW, while
the transmit power of a secondary was 0 dBW. Two nodes are considered neighbors if their
mutual distance is within the transmitting range of 10m, 20m, and 40m. Nodes calculate the
interference on each channel based on the interference received from their neighbors on all
channels. Based on the interference, nodes calculate the SINR on each channel and generate
the preference list. The background noise, n0 , is assumed to be -29.999 dBW. The size of
the preference list is different for each node as it is dependent on the location of the nodes.
The price of each channel is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 1 and 100.
In Fig. 6.1, we show the total number of nodes that are assigned channels for three
different values for the transmitting range R. As expected, higher transmitting range means
more interference to other nodes which decreases the chances of using a channel for more
than one node. Also, the ability to satisfy nodes with first preference is decreased.
In Fig. 6.2, we show what fraction of nodes get the most preferred channel. With
more number of nodes trying to acquire their most preferred channels, the chances of acquiring their most preferred is the least. However, if nodes are willing to settle with the
lower preferred nodes, then more nodes could be allocated. In fact, we show what fraction
get within a specific choice as the cumulative distribution function. Though nodes do not
necessarily get their most preferred channels, the overall channel utilization and the total
revenue increase.
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Figure 6.1 Number of nodes with channels assigned
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Figure 6.2 CDF of channels allocated with decreasing preference
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Fig. 6.3 shows the effect of transmitting range on the total number of SUs that
eventually get a channel assigned. Higher transmitting range leads to more interfering nodes
resulting in less nodes with channels assigned.
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Figure 6.3 Effect of transmission range (R) on channel assignment

In Fig. 6.4, we show the revenues generated by each primary when the number of SUs
were 32, 72, and 172. The revenues by each is based on the total number of nodes, conflict
between nodes, and position of the PUs. It is worth mentioning that the position of the
PUs also affect their revenue. Some PUs located close to many SUs will lead to increased
interference; thus reduced SINR. As result, SUs will have a lower preference for the channels
of that PU. Moreover, the positions of the SUs also affect the total revenue. If many SUs are
located near to each other then i) they would interfere with each other and ii) they would
likely to have the same preference for channels. Consequently, the chances of assigning the
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preferred channels to all decreases; thus the revenue generated is less. Fig. 6.5 shows the
total revenue generated by all the primaries with increasing SUs.
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Fig. 6.6 shows the fairness of the proposed algorithm based on Jain’s fairness index.
The overall fairness of the algorithm decreases when the number of secondary users and
transmission range increase. More number of secondary users and larger transmission range
lead to more number of unassigned users, as shown in Fig. 6.1. As a result, the overall
fairness decreases. On the other hand, when the number of secondary users increase within
the small transmission range (R = 10), there are no unassigned nodes and the fairness of
the proposed method is close to perfect (0.99).
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Figure 6.6 Jain’s Fairness Index

6.2

Double Auction-Based Channel Allocation

We consider up to 30 sellers and 50 buyers. Each auction was conducted for four rounds for
reasons discussed later. The transmit power of a primary PU was kept at 2 W (3.010 dBW),
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while the transmit power of a secondary was kept at 0 dBW. Two nodes are considered
neighbors if their mutual distance was within 20m from each other. All nodes calculated the
SINR for each channel and generated the preference list– the size of which varied based on
the location of the nodes. The background noise, n0 , is assumed to be -29.999 dBW. The
price of each band was assumed to be uniformly distributed between 1 and 100. The number
of bands to be sold by each seller was randomly chosen between 1 and 6, while the demands
of buyers are randomly chosen between 1 and 3 bands.
Since the method of grouping of conflict-free buyers is an important issue, we explore
three different ways, namely MAX-SINR, MIN-Degree, and MAX-Degree. For MAX-SINR,
the node with the highest SINR is assigned to the first group. Similarly, for MIN-Degree
(MAX-Degree) the node with the minimum (maximum) number of neighbors was assigned
to the first group.
Fig 6.7 shows how i) total number of allocated bands (T ), ii) allocated bands per
seller (U ), and iii) Jain’s fairness index vary as the number of sellers increases. With more
sellers, the buyers had more options to buy from and hence could acquire more bands as
shown in Fig. 6.7(a); however, due to competition and interference the number of bands
sold on average by a seller decreased as shown in Fig. 6.7(b). Fig. 6.7(c) shows the Jain’s
fairness index (JFI) for the three algorithms which determines whether the buyers receive a
fair share of the spectrum.
Generally, the performance of MAX-SINR, and MIN-Degree are better then MAXDegree. MAX-SINR and MIN-Degree give fewer number of groups with larger number of
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buyers in one group which indicates that the number of buyers in one VG is large. As a
result, the total number of successfully auctioned units (T ) is higher when using MAX-SINR
or MIN-Degree, than MAX-Degree. Also, MAX-SINR and MIN-Degree perform better than
MAX-Degree in terms of (U ) and fairness. However, MAX-SINR and MIN-Degree show
almost similar performance because the node with highest SINR is usually the node with
minimum number of neighbors. Thus, the starting node for both these methods are most
often the same. However, MAX-SINR is slightly better than MIN-Degree in term of fairness,
so we use MAX-SINR for the rest of results.
Generally, when there are more number of the sellers, the auctioneer’s revenue and
sellers’ revenue increase as shown in Fig. 6.8. Moreover, with more auction rounds, the
overall revenue increases as there could be buyers who win in subsequent rounds– but the
number of buyers who win in (r + 1) th round is usually lower than the number winning in
the rth round. For the experiments, there is not much different between third and fourth
rounds– so we stop after three rounds for the remaining experiments.
It is to be noted that the auctioneer’s revenue is higher than of the sellers because
of virtual grouping. The bid of a VG is the number of the buyers in that VG multiplied by
the minimum bid of the eliminated buyer. So, the difference between the asking price of the
seller and the actual bidding is more which goes to the auctioneer. With increasing number
of the buyers, the auctioneer’s and sellers’ revenue increase as show in Fig. 6.9. The number
of sellers was kept at 10.
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Figure 6.7 Comparisons of grouping methods
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Figure 6.8 Auctioneers’ and Sellers’ Revenue with increasing number of sellers
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Figure 6.9 Auctioneers’ and Sellers’ Revenue with increasing number of buyers
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Fig. 6.10 shows that the proposed method is successful in satisfying more buyers in
the first round with their most preferred channel. The number of winning buyers decreases
within more rounds, because of the decreasing number of available units to sell. However,
with more number of sellers, the number of winning buyers increases and the ability to
satisfy them with their preferred channels also increases. As mentioned earlier, most of the
allocations are made within the first three rounds.
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Figure 6.10 Number of satisfying buyers with their preference, with increasing number of
sellers and auction’ rounds

We compare our scheme with TDAMH as it based on almost same criteria as was
shown in Table 2.1. There are two ways to do the grouping in TDAMH: i) maximize the
number of groups, and ii) minimize the number of groups. These two methods are equivalent to our MAX-Degree and MIN-Degree. Thus, we compare MAX-Degree with TDAMHmaximize number of groups in terms of following metrics: i) total number of allocated bands,
ii) auctioneer revenue, iii) sellers revenue, and iv) fairness. Since we want to have a fair com106

parison, we use the same network topology such that the SINR for all buyers remain the
same. Moreover, we allow any buyer to bid for any seller.
The comparisons are shown in Figs. 6.11, 6.12, 6.13, and 6.14. As expected, total
number of allocated bands, auctioneer revenue, sellers revenue, and fairness for both methods
increase with more number of sellers. However, PreDA performs better than TDAMH since
it does the allocation considering the preference for channels by the buyers. As a result, the
total number of allocated bands and the revenue for PreDA is more than in TDAMH. The
fairness is also higher for PreDA.
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Figure 6.11 Comparison in terms of total allocated bands (T)
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Figure 6.12 Comparison in terms of auctioneer revenue
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6.3

Pricing-Based Routing

We assume that secondary nodes acquire different amounts of bandwidth from the primary
user by paying different prices. The cost prices (pcost ) are assumed to be uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1. Also, nodes are cooperative in the sense that they will forward packets
when paid the right amount. We consider that there are up to 40 nodes. The price that
a node pays to the primary for acquiring spectrum is assumed to be uniformly distributed
between 1 and 100. Bandwidth requirements for the source nodes are assumed to be 2 KHz.
Two nodes are considered neighbors if their mutual distance between them is within 20 m,
i.e., transmission range is 20 m. The buffer of each node can hold upto 100 packets beyond
which packets are tail-dropped.
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6.3.1

Route Selection Implementation

We implement the proposed routing scheme to find possible routes between the source and
destination nodes. Here, the objective is to find the best relay node at every hop. However,
such greedy selection might not always yield a valid path to the destination. Thus, only a
subset of the paths will be valid. By valid, we mean the paths that can satisfy the bit-rate
requirements of the source node. Out of all possible valid routes, we are able to identify
the one that is the most optimal in terms of the price paid. As the path loss exponent (α)
has an impact on signal propagation and hence the transmitter-receiver distance for correct
decoding, we use two values of α (2 and 3).
To find average values, we execute the simulation runs for random topologies. For a
given topology, we randomly chosen (without repetition) 200 source-destination pairs, if there
are that many. For each source-destination pair, we calculate the average for all variables for
all valid paths. For continue to do this for 10 different topologies, with all other parameters
remaining the same. We eliminate any observation, that may arise from a skewed topology.

6.3.2

Results

In Fig. 6.15, we show how the average number of hops varies with increasing number of
nodes in the network. It is to be noted that with more neighboring nodes, a transmitter
chooses a relay node that is relatively closer than others. This is because shorter transmitter110

receiver distances will yield higher SNR and higher thus capacity. With higher capacity, the
payment to be made by the buyer (transmitter) to the seller (receiver) will be low. Thus,
the intermediate nodes choose shorter hops (distance-wise) resulting in more hops per route.
As expected, with a lower path loss (i.e., α = 2) the number of hops is more than higher
path loss (i.e., α = 3).
As discussed earlier, not all possible paths are valid. In Fig. 6.16 we show the absolute
number of valid path and in Fig. 6.17 we show it as a fraction of all possible paths. As
expected, more paths are obtained with α = 2 than α = 3.
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Figure 6.15 Average no. of hops

Next, we show how the cost of routes vary with increasing number of nodes. In
particular, we show the average optimal price in Fig. 6.18. In fact, the route with the
optimal price is eventually chosen as the route for data transfer. In Fig. 6.19, we simply
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divide the optimal price by the corresponding hop count to get the average cost per hop. It
is evident that the cost is more for α = 3 than α = 2.
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Figure 6.18 Avg. optimal price
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6.4

Auction-Based Routing

We consider up to 40 nodes which were randomly scattered over a network. All nodes had the
same transmitting range of 20 m. Thus, two nodes are considered neighbors if their mutual
distance between them is within 20 m. Nodes calculate the interference on each channel
based on the interference received from their neighbors on all channels. All channels have a
bandwidth of 2 KHz. Required bit rate is assumed to be 2 Kbps. The transmit power is 0
dBW. Also, the background n0 noise is assumed to be -30 dBW. The price of each channel
is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The price that a node pays to
the primary for acquiring spectrum for each channel is assumed to be uniformly distributed
between 1 and 100.
We implement the proposed routing scheme to find all possible routes between the
source and destination nodes, and discover the most optimal one. Optimal path means the
path with the minimum total payment. However, for some source-destination pairs there
could be paths that are not valid. An invalid path means a path that cannot satisfy the bit
rate requirement of the source node.
As the number of channels has an impact on data availability and capacity, we study
their impact using two different values of the available channels (10 and 20). In order to
get a trusted result, we run the simulation for different topologies and calculate the average
values. For each topology, we randomly choose (without repetition) 200 source-destination
pairs. For each source-destination pair, and for all valid paths, we calculate the average
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for all variables. Then we repeat the experiments for 10 different topologies, with all other
parameters remaining the same. We discuss our results as per the two cases we discussed in
chapter 4

6.4.1

Case 1: Seller sells only one channel

As number of nodes in the network increases, the average number of hops in the optimal
route also increases as shown in Fig. 6.20(a). With more neighboring nodes, a transmitter
chooses a closer node than others. This is because shorter transmitter-receiver distances
yields higher SINR and thus higher capacity. With higher capacity, the payment to be made
by the buyer (transmitter) to the seller (receiver) will be low. Thus, the intermediate nodes
choose shorter hops (distance-wise) resulting in more hops per route. With more number of
channels the number of hops are also more.
As mentioned before, not all possible paths are valid. Fig. 6.20(b) shows the fraction
of valid paths over all possible paths. With more number of channels more paths are found.
Fig. 6.20(c) shows how the cost of optimal routes changes with increasing number of nodes
and number of channels.
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Figure 6.20 Routing with only one channel per hop
6.4.2

Case 2: Seller sells multiple channels

In this case, we increase the bit rate requirement of the buyer which necessitates the seller
to sell a bundle of channels to meet the demand. We also consider that the price of each
channel varies (fixed price for all channels is just a special case). With higher bit rate
and more available channels, there are more valid paths between source and detestation as
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shown in Fig. 6.21. The results are shown for four bit rates: 60, 80, 100, and 120 Kbps. The
average number of hops is shown in Fig. 6.22. Optimal price increases with higher bit rate
and decreases with number of channels as shown in Fig. 6.23. Fig. 6.24 shows the result of
optimal price with increasing bit rate requirement. As expected, a higher demand in bit rate
implies more cost. Also, fewer number of available channels results in increased cost.
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Figure 6.21 Fraction of valid paths with multiple channels

6.5

Single Channel Scheduling

We consider up to 160 nodes which were randomly scattered over the network. Two nodes
are considered neighbors if their mutual distance is within the transmitting range of 20m.
The SINR between the primary node and any secondary node on the channel is assumed to
be uniformly distributed between 0 dBW and 20 dBW.
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Figure 6.23 Avg. optimal price with multiple channels
At the beginning of each super-frame, the proposed scheduling algorithms create the
independent sets. Number of independent sets and users in each set are different based on
the SINR of the users which changes dynamically. We use both algorithms to assign slots
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Figure 6.24 Avg. optimal price with increasing bit rate requirement
to the users and obtain the i) throughput per slot for all users, ii) throughput per user per
slot iii) fractions of slots allocated, and iv) Jain’s fairness index.
In Fig. 6.25, we show the average throughput per slot due to all users for s = 4. While,
in Fig. 6.26, we show the average throughput per user per slot. More number of users means
more demand of throughput. Overall, the proposed algorithms have the ability to satisfy
more users with the concept of independent sets and reuse of the same channels within the
same super-frame, without any conflict. Thus, the system’s throughput is increased with
more number of users. On the other hand, the average throughput per user per slot is
decreased with more number of users. This is because of the size of the independent sets.
More users lead to larger independent sets, and as a result the available bandwidth in each
slots is divided among more users, which decreases the average throughput per user per slot.
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The main goal of the first algorithm is to maximize the throughput, while the main
goal of the second algorithm is to maximize the fairness, which is number of allocated slots.
In Fig. 6.25 and In Fig. 6.26 we show that first algorithm achieves more throughput
than the second one. While in Fig. 6.27 we show that the second algorithm allocates the
slots more fairly among users than the first one. The minimum value of the fairness index for
the second algorithm is 0.925 while it is 0.878 for the first one. However, for both, fairness
decreases with more number of users but not lower than 0.87 for 120 users.
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Figure 6.27 Jain’s Fairness Index

In Fig. 6.28 we exhibit the average fraction of slots allocated to all users for increasing
number of users. With more users, the fraction of slots allocated decreases as the available
bandwidth is shared among them. However, the proposed algorithms manages to assign slots
to all users as shown in Fig. 6.29.
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In Fig. 6.29, we show the effect of increasing the number of slots on the average
number of assigned user in each super-frame. As expected, we get an increasing function.
and in Fig. 6.30, we shows the effect of increasing the number of slots on the average number
of assigned user in each slot. As expected, we get a decreasing function.
In order to find the optimal size of super-frame, we vary the number of slot per
super-frame from 1 to 20. Using α = 0.5, we show the combined effect of nsf and nslot in
Fig. 6.31. As can be seen, the optimal size of super-frame is varies between 7 to 15 based on
the number of users.
For n = 80, the optimal value for s from Fig. 6.31 is found to be 9. This is also
verified by Fig. 6.32 that shows the Jain’s fairness index to attain the maximum around
s = 9.
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6.6

Multi-Channel Scheduling

In this section, we first evaluate the performance of our proposed queue-aware scheduling
strategies under the standard performance metrics, namely, throughput, user-level fairness,
blocking probability, and system delay. Subsequently, we conduct comparative performance
evaluation with respect to the conventional strategy, namely, queue-unaware scheduling.
We consider up to 120 nodes which were randomly scattered over the network. Number of channels are varied from 5 to 20, each with a bandwidth of 2 MHz. Two nodes
are considered neighbors of each other if their mutual distance is within the transmitting
range of 20m. The SINR for a transmitter-receiver pair is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 dBW and 20 dBW. Packets arrive to the queues of users following the
batch Bernoulli process with an average arrival rate of 250 packets every unit time, unless
otherwise specified.

6.6.1

Performance of Queue-Aware Scheduling Strategies

We study the performance of the proposed scheduling in two different ways depending on
how the non-interfering sets are created: i) at the beginning of each super-frame, which we
refer to as frame-by–frame scheduling, and ii) at the beginning of each slot, which we refer
to as slot-by-slot scheduling. For the simulations, we consider a frame to consist of 10 slots.
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In Fig. 6.33, we show the average throughput per slot due to all users and all channels,
(Sslot ). In Fig. 6.34, we show the average throughput per user/per slot due to all users and all
channels, (Sslot/user ). As expected, with more users, the total system throughput increases.
However, the throughput of each user decreases with increasing number of users. More users
lead to many non-interfering sets, and as a result the available bandwidth in each slot is
divided among more users, which decreases the average throughput per user per slot.
Overall, the proposed algorithm has the ability to satisfy more users and also attain
higher throughput via the use of the Markov model discussed earlier. Also, the ability to
use the same channel in the same slot by multiple users allows better spatial reuse of the
channels.
As expected, the performance of slot-by-slot scheduling is better than frame-by-frame
scheduling. This is primarily because the scheduler is able to make many short-term decisions
with less error than making decisions for all the slots in a frame. Of course, this enhanced
performance comes at the cost of more frequent schedule cycles.
Generally, the proposed methods have an ability to satisfy more users and yield more
system throughput compared with [50] and [49]. Since in [49], a channel is assigned only
to one user, there is no reuse of the channel within the super-frame. In [50], a channel is
assigned only to one user in slot, so there is no re-use of the channel within the slot.
In Fig. 6.35, we exhibit the average fraction of slots allocated to all users for increasing
number of users. With more users, the fraction of slots allocated decreases as the available
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bandwidth is shared among them. More number of channels mean more slots allocated to
the users. Again, both scheduling methods manage to assign slots to all users.

Avg. Fraction of Slots Allocated to all Secondary Users
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Figure 6.35 Avg. Fraction of Slots Allocated

With the objective of maximizing the throughput, users with low expected throughput
are not assigned any slots. Thus, with more number of users the fairness decreases. We also
show the effect of the number of channels on fairness in Fig. 6.36
In Fig. 6.37, we show the blocking probability when λ = 30 and number of channels
being 15. With more number of users the blocking probability increases. The blocking
probability is slightly better for slot-by-slot scheduling as non-interfering sets are calculated
after every slot allowing more users to be accommodated.
In Figs. 6.38(a), 6.38(b), and 6.38(c) we show the delay performance with varying
number of available channels, arrival rates, and number of users. In Fig. 6.38(a), λ = 30 and
number of channels =15, while in Fig 6.38(b), λ is varied between 10 packets per unit time
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(b) frame-by-frame

Figure 6.36 Jain’s Fairness Index
to 30 packets per unit time, number of channels was set at 15 with number of users being
80. In Fig 6.38(c), number of channels are varied between 5 to 20, with λ = 30, and number
of users as 80. As expected, with more users and higher packet arrival rates, the average
129

45
slot−by−slot
frame−by−frame

40

Blocking Probability

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

5

15

25

35
45
55
No. of Secondary Users

65

75

85

Figure 6.37 Blocking Probability
system delay increases, while with more channels the average system delay is decreases. It
has to be noted that the better delay performance of the slot-by-slot scheduling comes at
the cost of more frequent scheduling.

6.6.2

Performance Comparison with Queue-Unaware Approach

We now compare the queue-aware scheduling with queue-unaware scheduling in terms of
the total number of allocated slots to all SUs and the throughput each gets. Since our
performance studies have clearly demonstrated that the overall performance with slot-byslot allocation granularity is better than the frame-by-frame allocation, in comparative study
of our proposed queue-aware allocation with queue-unaware allocation we only consider slotby-slot allocation strategy.
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Figure 6.38 Average System Delay (in slots) with a) varying number of SUs; b) varying
arrival rates; and c) varying number of channels
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When the queue status is not accounted for scheduling purposes, the scheduler might
allocate slots to the SUs who do not have queued packets, thereby wasting resource. This
is shown in Fig. 6.39, where the queue-unaware scheduler unnecessarily allocates more slots
than the queue-aware scheduler. On the other hand, the queue-aware scheduler only assigns
channels/slots to the users with packets in their queue. As a result, the system throughput
is better, as shown in Fig. 6.40.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS

To realize the paradigm shift from static spectrum allocation to dynamic spectrum access,
a host of problems must be solved to make DSA a reality. In this dissertation, we addressed
some of the problems that arise due to spectrum trading and resource allocation (allocation,
routing and scheduling) in DSA networks from an economic perspective.
We started by considering a randomly deployed network where primary and secondary
users co-exist on the same spectrum bands and trade those bands amongst each other. We
proposed an auction-based allocation algorithm in a distributed multi-channel DSA networks,
where secondary users place multiple bids for the channels. The bids from a secondary user
are based on the quality of a channel as indicated by the SINR of that channel. The bids
are more for channels with higher SINRs than that with low SINRs. The proposed auction
scheme allocates channels based on the users preferences, considering the interfering users.
The proposed scheme guarantees conflict free allocation, channel reuse, and fairness.
Next, we proposed the PreDA– a preference-based truthful double auction for dynamic spectrum access DSA networks, where secondary users place multiple bids, and primary users place asks price for the bands of the channels. As the previous single auctionbased allocation, the bids from a secondary user are based on the SINR. The proposed
auction scheme allocates channels based on the users preferences, considering the interfer134

ing users. The proposed multi-bid auction tries to assign channels to the buyers with the
highest payment among the potential buyers, while guaranteeing the truthfulness by eliminating the buyer with minimum bid. Also, the proposed auction assures other economic
properties. Moreover, we used the concept of virtual groups to transform multi-unit bids to
the single-unit bids. The proposed scheme guarantees conflict free allocation, channel reuse,
and fairness.
For pricing and routing, we presented a log-based pricing scheme for the seller that is
based on its cost price and the amount of unsold bandwidth. Using the signal to interference
and noise ratio, we computed the bandwidth that a buyer must buy in order to achieve the
desired bit rate. The total cost of a route is the sum of the prices paid at each hop between
the source and the destination.
We proposed an auction-based routing algorithm where channels are traded between
transmitters and receivers based on the outcome of a sealed-bid auction. Each forwarding
node runs an auction among its neighbors, and explores all possible channel bundles and
routes between source and destination. We consider two cases where the seller bids for only
one channel or bids for multiple channels. In order to minimize the searching time and the
overhead, we proposed a heuristic based on unit price to find the near-optimal combination
of channels.
We proposed two scheduling algorithms for allocating time slots to secondary users.
Both algorithms utilized the channels by allowing multiple conflict-free secondary users to
use the same channel in the same slot. For maximizing throughput and achieving fairness, we
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used the SINR and number of allocated slots to find the independent sets. In case of multichannel allocation, we proposed a queue aware frame-by-frame and slot-by-slot scheduling.
We used the primary channel occupancy, channel quality, and the queue status to create the
discrete-time Markov chain to estimate the maximum expected throughput for each channel
on every slot. We maximized the spatial and temporal re-use of channels by allowing multiple
conflict-free secondary users to use the same channel on the same slots.
All theoretical proposition were validated through extensive simulation exterminates.
Results demonstrate how our proposed algorithms performed under different radio and network settings.
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